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Even as Trinidad and Tobago seeks productive diversification away from 
the energy sector, the process underlying the country’s productive 
development policies (PDP) is in a state of transition from state-directed 
industrial policy to a newer approach with extensive private-public 
participation. This study explores the main characteristics of four PDPs in 
Trinidad and Tobago and reviews them following the related literature 
(e.g., Rodríguez-Clare, 2005a and 2005b, and Melo and Rodríguez-Clare, 
2006). The four PDPs are: a) The process towards the Promotion of 
Clusters; b) the PDPs for the Tourism industry; c) the classical PDPs for 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and; d) the Free Trade Zone as a 
policy designed to compensate for the failure of the State. 
 
JEL classification: L52, O25, O54 
Keywords:  Industrial policy, Productive development policies, 
Diversification, Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago  
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  61. Introduction 
 
Trinidad and Tobago is a country rich in natural resources, having developed a world-
class energy cluster based on gas and oil. However, among top officials and other leading 
members of the society there seems to be general agreement that diversification into 
sectors other than energy represents a major medium-term goal. The policies analyzed to 
be analyzed in this study are closely related to that objective. 
The country constitutes a very interesting case for the analysis of productive 
development policies (PDP). Currently PDPs are in a state of transition from old-
fashioned industrial policy to a newer approach with intense private-public collaboration.  
Nevertheless, the older, more traditional interventions persist in Trinidad and Tobago, 
although a broader view involving new-type policies appears in a multi-sectoral report 
called Vision 2020.  
In fact, the promotion of information and communication technology (ICT), the 
generation of non-energy clusters and public intervention only in case of market failure 
are all ideas expressed in several Government reports, which are consistent with a more 
modern approach of PDPs. However, many of the policies that appear in official 
documents are a long way from implementation. Consequently, traditional measures such 
as supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) through fiscal incentives remain in force and are relatively important. 
In this study we will explore the main characteristics of four PDPs in Trinidad and 
Tobago, trying to use a global approach following their whole development process, from 
birth to maturity, whenever it is possible. In all the cases we will conduct a critical review 
of the selected policies following the literature of Produtive Development Policies (PDP) 
as expressed in, for instance, Rodríguez-Clare (2005a. and 2005b) or in Melo and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2006). The four PDPs are the following: a) The process towards the 
Promotion of Clusters; b) the PDPs for the Tourism industry; c) the classical PDPs for 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and; d) the Free Trade Zone as a policy designed 
to compensate for the failure of the State.  
 
  72. Trinidad and Tobago at a Glance 
 
2.1 General Information 
Trinidad and Tobago is a middle-income, energy-rich country with relatively strong 
institutions and political stability.  It is the most industrialized economy in the English-
speaking Caribbean. Since 1994 the country has been growing at an average rate of 7.7 
percent per annum, as shown in Figure 1, but this growth has been very unbalanced: it is 
led by the energy sector, which accounts for more than 45 percent of GDP and 80 percent 
of exports, but only 5 percent of employment. In the non-energy sector, growth has been 
much lower: the energy sector accounts for 29 out of the 51 points of the accumulated 
growth rate between 2002 and 2006, private sector services for 19 and the rest of the 
economy for just 3 points. What is even more striking is the low level of investment in 
the non-energy sector. Since 1991, capital stock has grown by 7 percent per annum, but 
this was due almost entirely to the energy sector since, in the non-energy sector, the 
capital stock has grown only at a modest rate of 1.5 percent. New investment has been 
directed mainly to the gas industry, after the discovery of new reservoirs.
1 These new gas 
products, however, do not really providing a strong source of diversification for the 
economy, since the prices of gas-related products are highly correlated with those of oil-












                                                           
1 Trinidad and Tobago is the world’s largest supplier of ammonia and methanol, as well as the largest 
supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas to the United States.  
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Figure 1. 
 
Although the recent trend has been influenced by the high energy prices, the 
econom
y resources are not 
flowing
                                                          
y shows a worrisome pattern: in the last 50 years the non-energy tradable sector’s 
share of GDP has been constantly shrinking, which means that the economy is more and 
more energy-dependent, increasing the risks of energy price shocks to the entire 
economy. In spite of the Government’s stated intention to diversify the economy, 
expressed in the Vision 2020 plan,
2 the share of the energy sector almost doubled in the 
last 15 years, and the pattern of investment for the last years 10 years shows that the 
actual levels would hold and probably increase even further. The trade policies and 
incentive schemes used to promote other activities have not paid off.  
One of the puzzles to be solved in Trinidad and Tobago is wh
 to the non-energy sector, particularly the non-energy tradable sector. Fairbanks et 
al. (2007) point out that, while the business platform is sound in Trinidad and Tobago, 
firms lack the necessary strength. Outside of the energy industry, no healthy clusters have 
 
2 The objective of the Vision 2020 plan is to become a developed country by 2020, with sustained and 
balanced growth, diversifying the economy and spreading out the benefits of the economic growth to the 
entire population. 
  9been developed and few local firms can provide sophisticated services to foreign energy 
companies. Thus, despite the comparative advantage of abundant oil and natural gas, true 
competitive advantages remain to be exploited. 
Artana et al. (2007) find that the country is exposed to “Dutch Disease”: the high 
exposu
F), formally established 
by an A
s income from oil and gas. 
Whene
re to energy price shocks might force the non-energy tradable sector to be even 
more competitive than in other countries where that risk does not exist. The historical 
correlation between the international oil price and Trinidad  and Tobago’s real GDP, 
which is close to 80 percent, is a fact that business managers know only too well. In this 
sense, growth opportunities could be very path-dependent and, although several reforms 
in the right direction have been implemented, current growth is limited by historical 
conditions. Not having a developed non-energy tradable sector can limit future growth 
due to lack of externalities in production, lack of forward and backward linkages, lack of 
learning-by-doing and lack of local entrepreneurship. As a consequence, the “natural 
resource curse” might reflect past rather than present conditions, and the current success 
of the energy sector might be in itself a constraint for the development of the non-energy 
tradable sector. From a macroeconomic point of view, in this economy more than in 
others, a very prudent fiscal policy, as well as clear and credible rules, is necessary to 
isolate the non-energy sector from the risks of the energy sector.  
The recently created Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HS
ct of Parliament in 2007, is a policy in the right direction, although it might still 
have problems of credibility. The HSF is supposed to meet two complementary goals. 
The first is to preserve the petroleum wealth stock for future generations (the heritage 
component) and the second is to protect government revenues from fluctuating oil prices 
in the international markets (the stabilization component).  
The HSF is supposed to be financed from exces
ver these revenues exceed the quarterly projected budget by more than 10 percent, 
60 percent of this difference is added to the fund. In the same way, when revenues are 
below projections, the government may withdraw using the same arrangement. Higher 
than budgeted oil prices have allowed for a build-up in the value of the Fund, which 
totaled close to US$ 2 billion as of May 2008 (approximately 8 percent of GDP). 
  10A more prudent fiscal policy, combined with the more stable macroeconomic 
environment of the last years, ought to have provided a better environment to overcome 
the natural resource curse. The question is whether enough has been done to boost growth 
in other economic sectors, and whether specific industrial policies are needed to ignite 
growth and overcome years of underdevelopment. Artana et al. (2007) consider that the 
situation in Trinidad and Tobago, as it relates to eliminating constraints to growth, is one 
of “fine tuning”: many macro reforms have already been implemented, but more is 
needed from the micro point of view to improve the competitiveness of key business 
clusters and improve the conditions for innovation and entrepreneurship.  
Regarding the institutional setting, Trinidad and Tobago belongs to the British 
tradition and is organized as a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. That is, there 
is a formal separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. 
According to Mottley (2008), however, real power has resided with the executive branch 
since Colonial times. In fact, under this system, decisive power was centralized in the 
colonial governor as the representative of the Crown. This tradition extends to the 
present, as real power resides with the Cabinet, particularly the Prime Minister, and 
Parliament can block only decisive bills. As government revenues are dominated by oil 
and gas-related taxes, local governments have little decision-making ability in regard to 
public expenditure. The narrow tax base of local governments consists of resources such 
as property and inheritance taxes. The centralization of resources reinforced the central 
government’s power. 
 
2.2 How Important Is Dutch Disease?  
 
Artana et al. (2007), using open forest analysis based on Hausmann and Klinger (2006, 
HK) and Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006, HHR),  found that Trinidad and Tobago 
ranked lowest among a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries in its capacity 
to diversify its production and export base. This is a consequence of its specialization in 
oil-related products and is a symptom of Dutch disease. HHR also found this 
characteristic for other oil-exporting countries. 
An important implication of open forest analysis is that the degree of 
sophistication will not improve that capacity unless economic policies compensate for 
  11Dutch disease. In fact, HK found that a one standard deviation increase in “open forest 
size” results in an increase of half a percentage point in the measure of sophistication of 
exports.
3 The characteristic of most of the oil-exporting countries is that they produce 
and export a good with a very specific endowment not easily interchangeable with other 
kinds of goods. Additionally, if one takes into account the sudden appreciations in the real 
exchange rate that usually characterizes these economies when the oil price is high, the 
development of other non-oil tradable sectors becomes a difficult task.   
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, Dutch disease is not merely a cyclical 
characteristic: although a booming international oil market could aggravate the disease 
through real exchange rate appreciation, the effect may be permanent. In fact, exports of 
oil and related products
4 historically represent 60-70 percent when measured in constant 
US dollars.
5  
As a consequence, the degree of export diversification (measured in real terms) 
did not change substantially in recent times despite the cyclical behavior of the price of 
West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI), the benchmark petroleum price. As illustrated 
in Figure 2, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index shows that export concentration fell only 












                                                           
3 Denominated as the “average productivity” of the exports. 
4 Chapter 27 in the Harmonized System 1992. 
5 Deflated by the Export Price Index - HS classification, U.S. International Price Program, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
  12Figure 2.  
HERFINDAHL CONCENTRATION INDEX FOR EXPORTS OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND THE 









































HHI WTI deflated by PPI USA (Right)
 
 Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Nonetheless, exports in nominal terms follow the pattern of movements in the oil 
price: export concentration tends to increase when the price of oil is high and vice versa. 
The coefficient of correlation between both series is 0.78 for the period 1980-2005.  
Another implication of our analysis is that the existence of uneven conditions for 
the rest of non-oil tradable sector due to this phenomenon makes every effort to improve 
export diversification a much harder task for economic policy. However, we will proceed 
under the assumption that necessary policies should be applied to mitigate Dutch disease.  
This means that the HSF would be designed accordingly to overcome the typical 
problems of volatility and currency overvaluation. Otherwise, the PDPs intended to attain 
the desired industrial and export diversification could result in a wasteful use of resources 
and efforts with the PDPs being totally ineffective and a drain on government revenues as 
a result of subsidies and other supporting fiscal measures. 
In this study, we shall therefore not discuss the necessity of export and industrial 
diversification of the non-energy sector: we shall take it for granted that the authorities 
and the society as a whole want to achieve more complex backward and forward linkages 
  13and industrial production less dependent on the energy sector as expressed in the Vision 
2020 documents. 
 
3. PDPs in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
According to Rodríguez-Clare (2005a), there were three kinds of interventions to 
complement the Washington Consensus reforms: a) macroeconomic reforms in order to 
reduce the high volatility observed in emerging countries, b) an enhanced institutional 
set-up to foster higher economic growth and c) microeconomic or “competitiveness” 
policies through public interventions with the goals of allowing sectors and companies to 
take advantage of the opportunities. 
Trinidad and Tobago has taken these steps with different degrees of success as a 
result of the reforms of the 1990s. In particular, to reduce macroeconomic volatility, 
advances have been made through the creation of the Heritage and Stabilization Fund 
(HSF). Also, reforms have been added to the previous market liberalization through some 
privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE), although State direct intervention 
through companies is still significant.  
As far as institutional quality is concerned, the country does relatively well on the 
basis of the indices of economic freedom (29
th out of 162 countries), ease of doing 
business (80
th of 181), voice and accountability (66 points out of 100), government 
effectiveness (66 points) and regulatory quality (71 points). However, Trinidad and 
Tobago underperforms in the spheres of political stability, rule of law and control of 
corruption. In the Global Competitiveness Index produced by the World Economic 
Forum, the country ranks 92
nd out of 134 countries. In sum, Trinidad and Tobago does 
not score high on the basis of indices of institutional quality, though all are better than the 
median for Latin American countries and six out of the nine measures considered them 
are not lower than the median value of neighboring countries. 
 
 
   
  14Table 1. 
 
S o u r c e s :            
(1) Doing Business 2009 report World Bank. Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1 
to 181, with first place being the best. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index means the 
regulatory environment is conducive to the operation of business. Figures for Latin America and the 
Caribbean represent country medians.     
 (2) The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (2008). Percentile rank (0-100), 0 representing  
the lowest rank among all countries in the world. Figures for Latin America and the Caribbean represent  
country medians.     
 (3) World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (2008). 
 (4) Heritage Foundation (2008). The 2008 Index of Economic Freedom covers 162 countries across 10 
specific freedoms such as trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights. 
         
          
Finally, concerning microeconomic interventions to enhance productivity, the 
country has taken significant steps to improve its PDPs, although there are still some 
elements of the old approach and problems of implementation, coordination and 
overlapping that might inhibit the potential effect beyond the above-mentioned Dutch 
disease. In the following section we present a brief review of the main historical approach 
to PDPs in Trinidad and Tobago. Afterward we analyze current PDPs in the country, 
emphasizing those aimed at industrial diversification and the process of selecting targeted 
sectors.  
  153.1 Brief Review of Historical PDPs 
 
Historically, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has played an active role in several 
economic sectors (vertical policies), often involved as a provider or a key decision-
maker, taking the responsibility for so doing away from the private sector. Some authors 
see this approach as a limitation to private sector development (e.g., Fairbanks et al., 
2007, and Artana et al., 2007).  
Since the mid-1950s, Trinidad and Tobago has applied diverse industrial policies 
that have changed over time. The People’s National Movement (PNM) government 
elected in 1956 pursued economic development through the “industrialization by 
invitation” model. According to Mottley (2008), in its first years, the country sought to 
industrialize following the example of Puerto Rico. In this initial stage, the government 
actively sought to attract investment using a newly created agency called the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC).  However, this policy was not successful, as the 
country could not match the benefits granted to US investors by the Puerto Rican 
government. In those years (1958-1973), there were three five-year development plans 
following a policy of state-directed economic planning. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the government implemented a policy of 
industrialization by import substitution (ISI). The main instrument of protection was the 
Negative List: items on this list would require a license for importation that was not 
easily acquired.  The IDC additionally began to construct service industrial parks during 
this period. In the 1970s there was an explosion of assembly-type industrial production. 
Goods assembled locally in response to the ISI strategy included (but were not limited to) 
mattresses, garments, radios, TVs, car batteries, motor cars, home appliances, light bulbs, 
processed foods and furniture. After 1984, the Negative List was replaced by high import 
tariffs amidst accusations of corruption in the granting of import permits. As of the mid-
1990s the authorities began to scale down the highly protective tariffs, unwinding the old 
ISI policy. 
In the third development plan, 1969-1973, the government outlined the need for 
investment in heavy industry, specifically the petroleum industry. Several events took 
place during those years which helped to increase the share of oil production in the GDP: 
in 1969, the Amoco Oil Company found a substantial oil reserve off Trinidad’s east 
  16coast; the following year, Amoco discovered an important natural gas reservoir; and, 
finally, there was an increase in oil prices after the Arab/Israeli war of 1973.  
From 1973 onward, oil production was an enormous source of revenue for the 
government. During this boom, the State of Trinidad and Tobago embarked on a broad-
based program of industrialization, spending part of its revenues on acquiring corporate 
assets. The policy followed basically a state-led approach rather than a private-led 
approach (Mottley, 2008). At its peak, 62 enterprises were owned by the state, covering 
sectors of activity as diverse as airlines, cement, telecommunications, hotels, food 
processing and, most importantly, energy.  
In fact, Trinidad and Tobago began a broad process of public ownership before 
independence with the acquisition of the Telephone Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
(Telco) and British West Indian Airways (BWIA) in 1960. The third development plan 
(1969-1973) states that the public sector would not “hesitate to enter either alone or in 
partnership with foreign or local private capital into the productive fields of industry, 
tourism or agriculture” (Bernal and Leslie, 1999). 
In the early 1980s, the fall in the international price of oil and in domestic 
production caused a severe decline in government revenues, and this circumstance forced 
the country to adjust to a lower level of income.  In order to avoid a new swing due to the 
dependence on oil, the new government elected in 1986 attempted a policy of industrial 
development based on the non-energy sector. Since then, several policies have been 
implemented to diversify the industrial fabric.   
Some State agencies such as the Tourism Development Company (TDC), the 
Business Development Company (BDC), the Estate Management and Business 
Development Company, Ltd. (EMBD), and the Sugar Manufacturing Company of 
Trinidad and Tobago (SMCOTT) have been key players, which might be seen as distrust 
of market mechanisms and the ability of the private sector to serve as an engine for 
development. In 2002 the Government issued a policy statement declaring as a top 
priority the divestment of management and ownership of State Operated Enterprises 
(SOEs), with preference given to local investors. Fairbanks et al. (2007) see this move 
related more to fiscal management than to any explicit connection to private-sector 
  17development, stressing that “moving the locus of responsibility to the private sector 
requires a shift in the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s approach.”   
The Government continued acquiring equities in various companies until the early 
1990s. However, a process of privatization took place since 1987 with a partial 
divestiture of the telecom company, TSTT (Telecommunications Services of Trinidad & 
Tobago), and the transfer to the private sector of Trinidad Cement. In 1991, the newly 
appointed Government outlined the need to let the private sector take the lead in the 
economy. However, the State would keep its stakes in strategic sectors such as oil and 
gas, telecommunications and other utilities.  
According to Bernal and Leslie (1999), by 1993 the Government had identified 30 
SOEs for divestment and 12 for liquidation and, by mid-1995, several companies had 
either been fully or partially privatized, including the Trinidad and Tobago Urea 
Company Ltd., the Trinidad and Tobago Methanol Company, BWIA international, the 
Iron and Steel Company and the Electricity Company. As for the energy sector, the 
exploration and production activities of the Trinidad and Tobago Oil Company 
(TRINTOC) and the Trinidad and Tobago Petroleum Company (TRINTOPEC) were 
merged into a new company, the Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago Ltd. 
(PETROTRIN). The new petroleum assets of both TRINTOC and TINTOPEC were 
divested. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the water and the sewage authority, WASA, 
was handed over in a contract of concession to a private company in 1996 but lasted for 
only three years under this regime.
6 
The main vision of the Government about PDPs in Trinidad and Tobago has been 
expressed in the Green Paper on The Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Policy 2007-2012, 
which builds on the foundation laid by the Enterprise Development Policy 2001-2005 and 
the Industrial Policy 1996-2000. The main strategy is to diversify the economy away 
from its dependence on the petroleum sector by developing non-oil manufacturing 
activities as well as services.  
The report identifies some problems and provides a set of eventual policies the 
Government might adopt. Most of these policies are Government-intensive in the sense 
                                                           
6 A private company operated WASA until 1999 when the Government did not renew the contract and the 
company reverted to the public sector. 
  18that the problems are intended to be solved through Government institutions more than 
market-oriented reforms, which is evidence that there is little or no change in Trinidad 
and Tobago’s approach to developing private business. There is, however, a change in the 
traditional approach, since these plans have been formulated in part through collaboration 
with private sector representatives. 
 
3.2 What Has Changed in the PDPs? The New Ideas of Trinidad and Tobago 
Policymakers  
 
A careful reading of the Green Paper
7 shows that the Government emphasizes a modern 
view of PDP. Additionally striking is the emphasis placed on diversifying the economy, 
increasing the weight of non-energy activities in GDP, employment and exports. 
This report states “government intervention should take place only if it could 
result in greater social and economical gains” (p. 31). Moreover, following the 
experiences of other countries around the world, the “Government’s involvement in 
business is limited to certain key, strategic and cultural industries. The recommended 
approach, therefore, is the creation and implementation of effective policies that target 
and address the inefficiencies in the market” (p. 31, italics ours).  
Note this definition’s similarities with a modern one of the Productive 
Development Policies (PDPs) as an effective set of microeconomic interventions 
specifically addressed to solve market failures (Rodríguez-Clare, 2005a). Also, it should 
be noted that this statement represents a retreat from the premises underlying the 1969-
1973 development plan. 
The Green Paper continues with the statement that the “investment regime will 
continue to place priority on stimulating entrepreneurship, increasing industrial expansion 
and services, as well as the promotion and diversification of exports” (p. 32). These 
policies, as will be explained below, are consistent with the traditional approach of 
supporting SMEs, the development of Free Trade Zones, and attracting FDI, among other 
measures.   
Finally, the report states there is no one way to address the “desire to increase the 
level and quality of investment.” Different sets of incentives would be recommended for 
                                                           
7 Green Paper on the Trinidad and Tobago Investment Policy 2007-2012. Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
  19the promotion of each sector, and no  single policy for all sectors (p. 32). Accordingly, 
authorities would assume that policies should be basically of a vertical rather than 
horizontal nature.  
And what sectors should be promoted? As will be explained below, the first 
choice of targeted sectors was based on an economic report elaborated by an international 
consultancy firm
8. In proposing what sectors should be promoted they consider several 
variables such as contribution to GDP, to employment etc. 
 
4. Selected PDPs for Detailed Assessment 
 
4.1 Basic Approach 
 
In this section we discuss briefly the selected PDPs and the justification for this selection. 
Taking into account the importance of these PDPs and their potential for improvement, it 
is necessary to make a critical evaluation taking into account their institutional setting, 
their probable economic justification, their likely impacts and some suggestions to 
improve the efficacy of the actual policies. 
To do this, we employ a global approach in which we empirically contrast the 
institutional context of the PDP (which, in some cases, may require that we go deeper 
into the origins and evolution of the PDPs) with their final outcomes and policy 
soundness. Briefly, each PDP is analyzed as an independent chapter within the following 
structure: 
 
a. Institutional setting 
Analysis of the institutional framework describing the incentives and 
the PDP process (agents involved, how policies are selected and 
designed, private-public sector collaboration, etc.). Some of the 
questions to be answered are: Who is in charge of the policy design 
and implementation? What are the main policies? What are the main 
instruments of these policies? What are the public or semi-public 
agencies in charge? Why, in the case of vertical policies, does the 
Government choose to target these specific sectors? 
 
                                                           
8 The report is the “Investment Promotion Strategy Study for Trinidad and Tobago” (1999). 
  20b. The Case for Policy Intervention 
PDP justification: Analysis of eventual market or government failures 
that justify specific policies in each sector or activity. 
 
c. Policy Outcomes and Recommendations for Improvement  
Assessment of the PDP.  This section evaluates the final outcome of 
each PDP: Are the policies coherent? Are they well targeted? Are they 
well designed? Are they consistent with the goal? Are there 
unintended consequences? What are the causes of diversion of the 
targeted actors or activities? 
 
4.2 Selected PDPs 
 
We have selected four PDPs for analysis. They were selected according to the following 
criteria: a) most are explicitly considered priorities in the government’s program and they 
are documented in the multi-sectoral statement of economic development (Vision 2020) 
and are cases of vertical policies; b) they show an enormous potential for improvement 
(cases of PDP for tourism, SME and FTZ) and; c) they are part of the ongoing debate 
around the need for industrial diversification.  
The following table summarizes the selected PDPs and their classifications 
according to the horizontal/vertical dimension and the public input/market channel of 
intervention (IDB, 2008). 




Macroeconomic stability so far
Harbours, ports and roads suitable for 
energy sector




SME: National Entrepreneurship 
Development Company Limited 
(NEDCO) / Business Development 
Company (BDC)
Old Industrial Policy: Vision 2020 with 
"targeted sectors" in manufacture
   * Business advisory service 1. Food and beverage
   * Loan programs for SME 2. Chemical and plastics
3. Metal processing
4. Leisure marine
5. Information technology and electronics
6. Printing and packaging
Tourism: Tourism Development Company 
and THA
Free Trade Zone (FTZ): in charge of 
the state-owned Trinidad and Tobago 
Free Zones Company
Public companies to develop sectors: oil 
(Petroleum Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago), gas (National Gas Company)
Transversality
Source: Authors’ compilation from IDB (2008). 
 
 
In our view, the public input/horizontal (HP) quadrant could be filled by a 
relatively stable economy and an acceptable business climate assessment. On the other 
hand, the HP space should include the unfavorable, overvalued exchange rate for non-oil 
production; most of this effect is related to the so-called Dutch Disease (see Artana et al, 
2007).  
In the public input/vertical (VP) quadrant we include, as an example, the 
infrastructure supply as developed in Trinidad and Tobago. This is concentrated on the 
most export-oriented sector, oil and gas production.  In this study we will exclude this 
quadrant and we will focus on the market intervention channel. 
Lastly, we will show in the market intervention quadrants examples of different 
policies. Due to its relevance, we will select for this study four market-intervention PDPs 
that will be detailed below. They are the following: 
  224.2.1 Vertical policies:  
a)  Cluster promotion of targeted sectors. The PDPs for these sectors involve 
several interesting aspects to be analyzed: the number and sectors chosen to 
promote changed several times. Originally, six specific activities were chosen 
(Food and beverage; Chemical and plastics; Metal Processing; Leisure marine; 
Information technology and electronics; Printing and packaging
9), but they were 
later changed in the process of policy design and implementation as a result of 
changes in coordination among the stakeholders. Although some progress has 
been made, the evidence seems to indicate that the policies are still far from being 
fully implemented and effective; therefore more than analyzing what the 
Government has done, we analyze what the Governments wants to do, what the 
private sector is asking for, and what we think needs to be done. 
b)  The PDP for the tourism sector. Surprisingly, this is underdeveloped in 
Trinidad and Tobago compared to other Caribbean countries. These policies 
depend on three different and not always coordinated organizations: the Ministry 
of Tourism, the Tourism Development Company (TDC) and the Tobago House of 
Assembly (THA). We analyze the policies they are implementing, whether they 
are grounded in market failure arguments and what are, in our view, the policy 
recommendations. 
 4.2.2 Horizontal policies:  
c)  Small and medium enterprises policies (SME PDPs) designed to deliver 
support to these types of firms. The main instruments are implemented by the 
NEDCO (National Entrepreneurship Development Company Limited), 
established in August 2002, and by the BDC (Business Development Company 
Limited);  
d)  The implementation of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) to facilitate export 
diversification and as FDI attractor, overcoming obstacles and distortions in the 
rest of the country. 
 
                                                           
9 In more recent times, seven sectors have been identified: Food and Beverage, Merchant marine, Yachting, 
Film, Music and entertainment, Fish and fish processing, and Printing and packaging. 
  234.3 General Overview of Current Institutions for the Selected PDPs 
 
Rodríguez-Clare (2005a) argues that governments should make selective interventions 
aimed at discovering new profitable activities (horizontal interventions) and at creating 
innovation clusters (vertical policies).  
An effective set of microeconomic interventions should specifically address the 
market failures that have an impact on economic development. Theoretical and empirical 
studies suggest two sets of market failures: a) externalities in the entrepreneurial process 
of discovering new profitable investment opportunities (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) 
and b) coordination failures in taking necessary actions to increase sector-wide 
productivity.  Both types of interventions, horizontal and vertical, are key to economic 
growth, but, according to Rodríguez-Clare the mix of their applications depends on the 
stage of development of the country.   
Market intervention policies applied in Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
including Trinidad and Tobago, are not new: export promotion, FDI attraction, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) support programs and innovation promotion. In fact, 
several instruments and perhaps an even larger number of goals exist to put the country 
on the path of export and industrial development in non-energy production. Although 
there are seven identified sectors to be targeted by the PDPs, they exist together with a set 
of other PDPs also directed to other particular sectors, such as tourism.  
Generally speaking, in Trinidad and Tobago the Ministries are in charge of 
outlining policies, and a set of related agencies take the responsibility of implementing 
them following the instructions of the Minister. It should also be noted that public 
intervention through state-owned enterprises is pervasive, especially in the energy sector. 
It was estimated that expenditures from public enterprises reached 36.8 percent of GDP 
in 2007, whereas Central Government outlays amounted to approximately 28 percent of 
GDP in the same period.
10 Figure 3 shows the main official institutions in charge of the 
PDPs selected for this study.  
 
 
                                                           
10 Source: Staff Report for the 2007 Article IV Consultation, August 2007. International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
  24Figure 3. Institutions Involved in Productive Development Policies 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The main responsibilities of each institution are outlined below: 
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). This Ministry is in charge of the trade 
reform process aimed at enhancing competitiveness. It also has a major role in 
developing the country’s industry, especially the seven targeted sectors. It is also 
responsible for stimulating both domestic and foreign investment and is the official 
Secretariat for the Prime Minister’s Standing Committee on Business Development, 
which is an advisory body to Cabinet. To sum up, the MTI coordinates trade and 
industrial policy.  
The following agencies implement the MTI’s policies: 
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technical and financial support to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This 
agency grants limited loan guarantees for the acquisition of working capital through 
financial institutions.  
Evolving Technologies and Enterprise Development Company Limited (eTeck). 
This agency has the following mandates: i) supplying proper infrastructure through 
the development of industrial parks, ii) encouraging diversification of the country’s 
non-energy and downstream from energy production and export bases, and iii) 
exploring niche areas of investment for local and foreign companies. In short,   
eTeck is a sort of investment promotion agency 
Trinidad and Tobago Entertainment Company (TTEnt). This agency has the 
responsibility to facilitate international exposure of the local entertainers; to market 
and promote the national creativity; to influence positive perception of Trinidad and 
Tobago’s arts and culture abroad; to assist local entertainers and artistes in accessing 
funding for projects geared towards the export market; and to facilitate private 
sector investment both locally and abroad into the entertainment industry. To sum 
up, this agency promotes cultural diffusion and investment in cultural affairs. 
Trinidad and Tobago Film Company Limited (TTFC). The main responsibilities of 
TTFC include functioning as a one-stop shop to facilitate film and television 
production; to assist local producers in accessing funding for the production and 
distribution of their products and for providing access to channels for distribution; 
and to market and promote the country’s film industry in the international market. 
Trinidad and Tobago Free Zones Company Limited (TTFZC). The TTFZC 
regulates companies in free zones and makes recommendations to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry on enterprises eligible for free zone status. The company is also 
in charge of administering the Free Zones Act (1988). 
Venture Capital Incentive Programme (VCIP). The main objective of the VCIP is 
to increase the supply of risk capital to the entrepreneurial small business sector. 
This is done through the granting of tax credits to investors to qualifying companies.  
 
  26Ministry of Labor and Small and Micro Enterprise Development. This Ministry has 
responsibilities for providing services to employers, labor unions, and individual 
workers. These functions include Administrative Services, Conciliation Services, 
Occupational Safety and Health Issues, Labor Inspectorate Services, Library 
Services, Research and Planning Services, Trade Union Services, and, Friendly 
Societies Services. In addition, Co-operative Activities and Employment Services 
are also provided by the Ministry. 
 
National Entrepreneurship Development Company (NEDCO).  This agency 
focuses on micro business (up to five employees, with no more than TT$ 250,000 in 
assets or sales). As will be explained in detail below, NEDCO provides small loans, 
training and general advice to micro businesses. The agency’ targets are non-
traditional small production and services.  
 
Ministry of Tourism. This Ministry is responsible for formulating policies to guide the 
tourism industry; conducting research on tourism-related issues; monitoring and 
evaluating tourism industry initiatives and development; networking between 
stakeholders; developing and implementing tourism-related projects; facilitating 
tourism investment and the general development of the industry; building awareness 
of the tourism industry; providing lifeguard services; and monitoring the operations 
of the Tourism Development Company (TDC). 
Tourism Development Company (TDC). The TDC’s responsibilities are to establish 
and to implement standards for the development and maintenance of tourism 
infrastructure and amenities, as well as standards for all identified tourist sites and 
attractions. The TDC is also responsible for the rationalization of the ownership of 
all beach facilities, tourism sites and attractions and maintenance of those identified 
facilities and amenities. All elements of tourism marketing and promotion are the 
exclusive responsibility of the TDC, including the promotion of hotel investment 
opportunities. The agency is mandated to manage the State’s interest in all new hotel 
development and facilitate applications from tourism investors for concessions 
under the Tourism Development Act or similar legislation. The TDC is also 
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mandated to upgrade the reception and information service facilities at the 
destination’s official ports of entry, in collaboration with other relevant 
stakeholders. Where the functions of the TDC relate to Tobago, all activities are 
planned and accomplished in consultation with the Tobago House of Assembly 
(THA). 
 
The Tobago House Assembly (THA), Division of Tourism and Transportation. 
Section 25 (1) of the THA Act, 1996, gives the THA Division of Tourism and 
Transportation responsibility for the formulation and implementation of tourism 
policy for Tobago so that the THA is responsible for its own tourism promotion and 
development, and overseas marketing of Tobago in collaboration with the TDC.   
 
As can be seen, there are many agencies involved in the implementation of PDPs. 
They are divided according to the activity to be encouraged—small business, 
entrepreneurship, export promotion and investment attraction—more than the targeted 
sectors; the few exceptions include entertainment, films and tourism. Table 3 summarizes 
the main activities and responsibilities undertaken by the different agencies. 
 Table 3. PDP Activities and Responsibilities by Agency 
































Trinidad and Tobago Film 
Company Limited (TTFC) 
Film Industry  Provides up to 30 percent rebate for filming on location in Trinidad and Tobago. These rebates are based on the 
expenditure in the country. 
Provides an administrative structure to facilitate all incoming film crews to Trinidad and Tobago. 
Acts as liaison with different Ministries and co-ordinates permits to film. 
Networks with Customs and Excise Division to allow for the temporary importation of film, television and radio equipment 
without crews having to post a Bond, or pay duties and Value Added Tax (VAT). 
Facilitates media accreditation and support of the Copyright Organization of Trinidad and Tobago (COTT) for the protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights. 
Networks with industry partners for reduced rates for airline travel, accommodation, transport and other support service 
providers. 
Provides information on services available by certified and approved Tour Guide Operators and Tour Guides.  





Financial aid to artists through the Revolving Investment Arrangement (RIA). The funds granted will cover up to 70 percent 
of the investment and are granted on the condition that T&T Ent. receives a negotiated return on its investment. 
Familiarization Tours of the country for international executives in the music industry and successful Trinbagonian visual 
and performing artists living abroad to assist in exporting local talent and products; 
Networks with foreign executives of the industry and with locals living abroad; 
Purchasing airtime on international mainstream broadcast media. The company will also facilitate the annual participation of 
artists in International Music Festivals such as the international trade fair MIDEM. 
Joint venture projects to stage International Promotional Music Concerts and Major Theatrical Productions abroad. 
Trinidad and Tobago Ent. Online for downloads of the collected archives of our local soca, chutney, calypso and other 
genres of music and music videos. In addition, there will be a national database of artists and cultural entrepreneurs as an 
Entertainment Directory. 
Evolving TecKnologies and 
Enterprise Development 
Company Limited 
FDI and ICT.  Trinidad and Tobago Country Branding and Investment Promotion. This is a sort of Investment Promotion Agency. 
In charge of the administration of existing Industrial Parks. 
To encourage the development of the ICT, knowledge based and downstream energy industries. 
Ownership, development and management of the Tamana InTech Park. 
Management of the lease operatorship for the Hilton Trinidad and Conference Centre and the Tobago Hilton 
Development and delivery of non-energy industrial sector incentives. 
Collaborating with TDC and NEC in the development of promotional strategies as well as material on Trinidad and Tobago. 
Business Development 
Company (BDC) 
SME Loan  guarantee  program. 
Lease financing through Caribbean Leasing Company Limited (CLCL). 
Tax breaks for SME. 
Grants to encourage innovation in the non-energy sector.   
Support for participation in international fairs and mission. Dissemination of other relevant information (market research, 
trade agreement, etc.) 
Trinidad and Tobago Free 
Zones Company Limited 
(TTFZC).  
FDI  In charge of the Implementation of the Free Trade Zone Act (1988). 
Venture Capital Incentive 
Programme (VCIP) 
SME  This program was introduced to promote the formation of Venture Capital Companies (VCC’s).  
Granting of tax credits to investors of VCC’s. 
Provide entrepreneurs with advisory services and pre-investment technical support necessary for them to secure funding for 
their projects (through the Advisory and Mentoring Unit, AMU). 




































  NEDCO Microenter-
prises 
Direct financial assistance to micro-entrepreneurs. 
Providing training programs for entrepreneurs. (Entrepreneurial Training Institute & Incubation Centre,ETIIC). 


























sector in T&T 
TDC is in charge of applying the Tourism Development Act (1999), which includes responsibilities in granting fiscal relief 








































 5. Vertical PDPs 
 
5.1 Clusters Promotion 
 
5.1.1 Institutional Setting: Origins, Main Actors and PDP Process 
 
The prescription for moving Trinidad and Tobago towards prosperity through industrialization 
on the basis of the exploitation of natural gas as the source of growth of new industries dates 
back to 1975.  More recently, the present Prime Minister, Patrick Manning, created a committee 
to develop strategies for the country in order to achieve developed status by the year 2020.  
The Multi-sectoral Group (MSG), also called the Vision 2020 Planning Committee, was 
asked by the Government “to lead the process of planning to develop a national strategy that 
would guide this country to becoming a developed nation by the year 2020,”
11 resulting in the 
392 page document entitled “Draft National Strategic Plan Vision 2020.” This plan identifies up 
to 28 sectoral fronts through an inclusive process of participation by different actors. Although 
the document has been published, many of the issues regarding future industrial policy have not 
been settled (Mottley, 2008). 
Figure 4 illustrates the consultative process between the Government and the MSG and 
the involvement of different stakeholders. In 2002, the Cabinet of the Government of the 
Trinidad and Tobago established a 25-member Vision 2020 Planning Committee. The MSG’s 
membership was drawn from diverse fields in a voluntary undertaking to guide the planning 
process of the Draft. The MSG established 28 subcommittees to develop strategic plans in 
sectors/areas of interest to the country. These 28 groups were clustered under six headings 
designed to facilitate easy management of the planning process: 
 
•  Business and Productive Sectors 
•  Human Resource Development 
•  Technology and Innovation 
•  Health and the Environment 
•  Public Institutions, Public infrastructure and housing 
•  Social Framework 
                                                           
11 Draft National Strategic Plan, Vision 2020. 
[In: http://vision2020.info.tt/cms/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.] 
  31The subcommittees were mandated to produce comprehensive sector strategic plans for their 
focus areas; their membership was determined by the MSG, the Secretariat and the respective 
chairs. The documents formulated by the subcommittees, known as Sector Strategic Plans, are 
supposed to be as operational as possible. 
 
  Figure 4. Participants and Information Flows in Consultative Process  
 
 
        Source: Draft National Strategic Plan, Vision 2020. 
 
Chapter 5 of the main report, the Draft National Strategic Plan, discusses the MSG’s 
ideas of the MSG about fostering competitive businesses. In this chapter, on page 50 it is stated 
that one of the strategies for building up competitiveness is to introduce policies that “support 
knowledge generation and thereby facilitate industrial cluster development within the non-energy 
export sector.” In a 1999 study commissioned by the Tourism and Industrial Development 
Company (TIDCO), “Investment and Promotion Strategy Study for Trinidad and Tobago,” it is 
pointed out that special attention should be given to “energizing” the light manufacturing 
  32industries of six sectors: Food and Beverage, Chemicals and Plastics, Metal Processing, Leisure 
Marine, Information Technology and Electronics and Printing and Packaging. 
However, the Government later increased to seven the number of sectors to be targeted 
and, at the same time, replaced some of them.
12 The currently selected sectors are the following: 
 
•  Food and Beverage 
•  Printing and Packaging 
•  Merchant Marine 
•  Film 
•  Music and Entertainment 
•  Fish and fish processing 
•  Yachting 
 
It should also be noted that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) was included as 
an additional activity. 
Once the targeted sectors were agreed upon by the Government and the consultants, a 
process of consultation through the MSG was established in order to find ways to enhance the 
productivity of the different sectors. Before specifying the main policies, we will review how the 
sectors were chosen and how they have been modified since 1999. 
 
5.1.2  The Path to Choosing the “Winners” 
 
In 1992 the Government of Trinidad and Tobago entered into a loan agreement with the World 
Bank for a Business Expansion and Industrial Restructuring project. The institutional 
strengthening of TIDCO was part of this agreement. TIDCO commissioned the report 
“Investment Promotion Strategy Study for Trinidad and Tobago” to the Trade Development 
Institute of Ireland Limited (TDI). The principal objective of this document was to propose an 
Investment Promotion Strategy for the agency charged with this responsibility, then TIDCO and 
now eTeck and other agencies.  
                                                           
12 Also Fairbanks et al. (2007) pointed out that in Trinidad and Tobago leisure marine, tourism, and manufacturing 
(including plastics, packaging, and printing, and food and metal processing) would offer immediate prospects, while 
information technology and information services would hold particular promise both as clusters and as enablers for 
developing other clusters. 
  33The report was intended to develop “a strategy and a cost-effective supportive program 
for the short and medium term and the promotion of T&T as an attractive location for 
internationally competitive manufacturing and service industry.”  That is, the tasks of the 
consultants were to elaborate the guidelines of TIDCO, the resources for the plan and the 
necessary marketing to attract investment. 
The stakeholders from the private sector highlighted some problems that were adversely 
affecting domestic investment: 
 
•  The lack of consistency in Government trade policy and the poor 
dissemination of information on the impact of ongoing trade agreements; 
•  Financial constrains derived from the absence of an active stock market and 
risk-adverse banks; 
•  The lack of entrepreneurial spirit due to the scarce availability of venture 
capital.  
 
The report also stated that “the development of a risk-averse business culture has reduced the 
capability of the domestic sector to make a greater contribution to job and economic 
development” (p. 7). 
However, in Artana et al. (2007), it is found that the credit conditions are relatively good 
in Trinidad and Tobago, as the country has sufficient resources and financing is relatively cheap, 
and the micro evidence shows that a high proportion of new investment in the non-energy sector 
is financed through the banking system under reasonable conditions regarding interest rates and 
collateral requirements. Therefore credit availability does not seem to be an important constraint 
to growth. Nevertheless, financial depth and access to finance are somewhat inadequate, and the 
main explanation for this lies in weak demand for loans, showing that the problem in the non-
energy sector may be the lack of opportunities due to other factors (e.g., overvaluation of the 
exchange rate, infrastructure, quality of education). 
The report also remarks that reasons for attracting FDI include increasing employment, 
exports, domestic absorption and tax revenues.  While all these benefits could also be attained by 
increasing domestic investment, others are in fact more linked to foreign investors, such as 
modernization of machinery and manufacturing processes and integration with external markets. 
  34As will be discussed in the FTZ section below, the goals of FDI attraction could be more 
efficiently attained through other policies. 
The reports suggested that, once a potential investor is identified, the agency should be 
actively involved in the entire investment process of investment through ongoing stimulus,   
invitations to meet with potential partners and publicizing the country’s benefits for investors. In 
other words, TIDCO should intermediate in order to attract investment. This recommendation 
seems to be government intensive r than based on market incentives. 
The suggested tasks of the investment agency are the following: 
 
a) Identifying a list of potential target investors; 
b) Making contact with those investors; 
c) Stimulating the interest of potential investors; 
d) Securing meetings between the agency and the potential investors; 
e) Securing and organizing visits by potential investors to Trinidad & Tobago; 
f) Undertaking regular reviews of progress. 
 
The report additionally proposed as target markets of potential investors the United States,   
Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, France (Food and IT), Switzerland (Chemicals) and some 
Mercosur countries. The sectors on which the agency should be focused are those taken from a 
larger list by TIDCO. These were the six sectors mentioned: Food and beverage, Chemicals and 
plastics, Metal Processing, Leisure marine, Information technology and electronics and Printing 
and packaging. 
  
  35Table 4 shows the number of sectors targeted at different stages of the policy process. 
 
Table 4. Targeted Sectors in Trinidad and Tobago 
Suggested by the Trade 
Development Institute 
of Ireland in 1999 
Selected by TIDCO 
Vision 2020 
(2001) 





Food and Beverages  Food and Beverages  Food and Beverages  Food and Beverages 
Chemicals Chemicals,  including 
Plastics 
  
Building Materials       
Clothing and Textiles       
Other Manufacturing  Metal Processing     
Printing and Publishing  Printing and Packaging  Printing and Packaging  Printing and Packaging 













   
Yachting Leisure  Marine  Yachting Yachting  Industry 
Warehouse/ 
Transshipment 
  Merchant Marine  Merchant Marine 
Music and 
Entertainment 





      Fish and Fish Processing 
Sources: Investment Promotion Strategy Study for Trinidad and Tobago (TDI- TIDCO), June 1999; Vision 2020, 
Draft National Strategic Plan, 2001; Green Paper on the Trinidad and Tobago Investment Policy 2007-2012, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry; and Ministry of Trade and Industry, Business Development, (in 
http://www.tradeind.gov.tt/Business_Dev/industries.htm). (*) Although this is not part of the targeted sectors, this is 
an activity that the government wants to stimulate. 
 
  
  36It is remarkable how the number and the set of activities selected by the government have 
been changing all along. In fact, in the Green Paper on Investment Policy (year 2006) the number 
of sectors was different from those stated in the Vision 2020, since metal processing and 
chemicals and plastics were dropped from the short list. At the same time, yachting replaced the 
more general “leisure marine,” while Merchant marine, Film and, finally, Music and 
Entertainment were introduced as new sectors to be fostered by industrial policy. The list 
changed even more recently as the Ministry of Trade and Industry added a new sector, the fish 
and fish processing industry. Therefore seven sectors are now targeted, and ICT might be 
included as an eighth. 
In the case of ICT, the government has taken steps to liberalize the telecommunication 
sector in order to provide cheaper communication costs, and two companies (DIGICEL and 
LAQTEL) have been granted licenses in addition to the company partially owned by the 
government (TSTT).  The idea is to create an Information Technology cluster around the 
University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT), which has been established in a new campus at 
Wallerfield. The state-owned company, Evolving Technologies and Enterprise Development 
Company Limited (eTeck), has been building new industrial parks in Debe, Dow Village, 
Endeavor, Factory Road, Frederick Settlement, Point Fortin, Preysal and Reform. eTeck is in fact 
“responsible for developing the Light Industrial Parks in Trinidad and Tobago by encouraging 
diversification of the country’s non energy and downstream from energy production and export 
bases, exploring niche areas of investment for local and foreign companies, as well as providing 
infrastructural support by development of eTecK Parks throughout Trinidad and Tobago.” 
According to Mottley (2008), the government’s main investment in diversifying away 
from energy has been the founding of UTT and eTeck.  The UTT was founded in 2004 with a 
double objective: to become a center of Research and Development (R&D) focused on the 
technologies related to the targeted sectors and to be a center of training in specific skills 
required for those activities.  Its activities are supposed to mirror the needs of the strategic 
sectors identified for development in Vision 2020. For the purpose of ensuring that its objectives 
are achieved, a range of programs has been developed and is being increased.  According to the 
UTT website, in order to offer a competitive curriculum, the UTT has signed strategic alliances 
with foreign institutions of renown. 
  37In addition, the eTeck company, founded in 2004, resulted from a Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago proposal to divest the assets of the Property and Industrial Development 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago (PIDCOTT) from the Tourism and Industrial Development 
Company Limited (TIDCO) and create an independent entity that would own and manage 
various real estate holdings on behalf of the Government, including 17 industrial parks across the 
country. Today eTeck concentrates on non-energy business development, as well as knowledge-
based and downstream energy industries, currently managing and maintaining 19 light industrial 
parks with over 500 tenants whose scope of operations is in the non-energy and downstream 
from energy base. eTeck is also developing eight other new light industrial parks to stimulate 
growth of industries in the non-energy sector and the Tamana InTech Park, the first of its kind in 
the Caribbean with its cutting-edge technology, “smart’ green buildings and an environment to 
facilitate R&D businesses, software developers, biometrics researchers and business intelligence 
incubators 
eTeck encourages investment in the Tamana InTech Park on the grounds that, among 
other things, investors would benefit from an environment that i) is rich with networking 
opportunities, ii) holds the potential for equity injection and business development through 
government funds, and iii) possesses the ability to hire highly skilled personal trained in the 
UTT. 
Finally, it should be noted that the National Productivity Council, an initiative to boost 
labor productivity in the manufacturing sector, was launched in June 2008. This tripartite 
Council was set up in order to develop and implement a public awareness program and conduct a 
baseline survey on productivity levels in the country. The Council will collaborate with 
international agencies such as the International Labor Organization (ILO). It will also undertake 
preparatory work to establish a National Productivity Centre, which will, among other things, 
facilitate educational programs on the improvement of national productivity.  
 
5.1.3 The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
For Rodríguez-Clare (2005b), industrial policy should be interpreted as promoting clustering in 
sectors where the country has a comparative advantage rather than creating new sectors. For 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), industrial policy is more about discovering the country’s 
comparative advantage. 
  38An important question, however, arises in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. How is a 
country supposed to promote clustering if most of its comparative advantages are hidden or 
difficult to develop because of Dutch disease? In this case, the Hausmann and Rodrik approach 
would seem to be especially suitable because they tend to emphasize that industrial policy should 
be designed to discover those sectors that are still undiscovered. Notice that, in the case of a 
country with Dutch disease, since the other comparative advantages might be hidden, vertical 
PDPs could become ineffective in diversifying away from the prosperous energy export sector. 
It is difficult to determine whether the selection of sectors effectively represents the idea 
of “picking the winner” or that of encouraging the development of sectors in which the country  
already has a comparative advantage. When a country suffers from Dutch disease, it is hard for 
any sector be a successful exporter if it is not closely related to oil and gas production. At 
present, what the data show is that the set of exports is effectively highly concentrated in the 
energy cluster. 
Rodríguez-Clare (2005b) emphasizes that it would be preferable to foster “innovation 
clusters” in sectors where the country has a comparative advantage than a diffuse policy directed 
to innovation in general. Given that there is evidence of local positive externalities in innovation 
activities, decentralized agents will invest less than the optimum. The coordination failure is in 
producing a good without the investment in innovation necessary to enhance its productivity or 
its quality. 
Rodríguez-Clare also argues that it would be more effective to think of innovation 
policies as means of solving cluster-specific coordination failures that prevent firms from 
innovating. How can we detect activities of innovation with spillovers? The author offers several 
clues based on empirical findings: 
 
a)  It is likely that spillovers are found among firms located close together. In the 
case of Trinidad and Tobago there are sectors that, due to their natural conditions, 
tend to be geographically concentrated. This is the case with agricultural 
production (i.e., food), the yachting industry, and merchant marine and fishing 
activities. However, there are other cases where this is not necessarily true.  
b)  It is probable that spillovers exist among firms undertaking similar or related 
activities. In this sense, activities tend to be similar among sectors. 
  39c)  Spillovers depend on how innovation activities are done and on the context in 
which they take place. He points out that activities from universities or 
specialized centers generate stronger spillovers than those undertaken in 
corporations. 
 
According to Rodrik (2004), PDPs complement market forces by reinforcing or 
counteracting the allocation effects that existing markets would otherwise produce.  He takes into 
consideration the fact that the location and magnitude of the market failures is highly uncertain. 
Thus, the task of industrial policy is also about extracting information from the private sector on 
significant externalities and their remedies as it is about implementing the policies. 
In fact, eliciting information on market failures from the private sector is a key feature of 
the Government’s policy process. Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel (2008) consider a “good” 
industrial policy to consist of those institutional arrangements and practices that effectively 
organize effectively public-private sector collaboration. They distinguish between two levels of 
industrial policies: one designed to address distortions of existing industries through stepwise 
increases in their capacities and the other to change the pattern of production through assisting  
the process of “self-discovery.” 
This distinction is important from an institutional point of view. Public-private 
cooperation is crucial in solving problems of missing public inputs or coordination externalities 
but less important in changing the specialization of the country. The latter requires considering  
what industry should be developed, and this is a more centralized process.     
Melo and Rodríguez-Clare (2006) argue that there are currently two approaches to 
industrial policymaking in the region, which they call the two-paradigm hypothesis: i) the 
demand-driven approach and ii) the strategy-driven approach. The former represents a set of 
policies  responding to the needs of the private sector in order to enhance productivity and 
competitiveness, which matches the first level of Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel (2008). In 
contrast, the strategy-driven approach arises from an explicit definitions of the desired medium 
and long- term changes in the vector of goods and services produced by the economy, which fits 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel’s second level. To draw examples from other countries in the 
region, the demand-driven approach might be represented by Colombia’s PDP process, while the 
strategy-driven approach might be represented by the Brazilian PDP process.  
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5.1.4 Policy Outcomes and Suggestions to Improve the Policy Process 
 
Even though some efficient sectors may remain undiscovered in Trinidad and Tobago due to an 
overvalued real exchange rate or more generally to the so-called Natural Resource curse (Sachs 
and Warner, 2001), the Government has chosen seven specific activities to support. However, 
there exists the risk that not all of them represent the most efficient sectors—or at least those 
with potential comparative advantages.   
A summary of some of the recent PDPs intended to increase the productivity of the seven 
selected sectors can be seen in the Appendix. Notice that, in most of them, innovation policies 
are not of concern to the authorities but, on the contrary, they are focused on fiscal incentives or 
financial support unrelated to such a process. However, some initiatives such as improving the 
standards in food or fish processing are PDPs intended to coordinate stakeholders through 
addressing market failures, as shown in Table 5.   
 
Table 5. Comparison of Initiatives Addressing or Not Addressing Market Failure 
Sector  Addressed to market failure  Do not address market 
failure 
Food and Beverage  Agricultural access roads and 
bridges. 
Dissemination of market 
information. 
Youth apprenticeship program in 
agriculture. 
Technological package for poor 
farmers (Grow box 
development). 
Improvement of food safety. 
Creation of large farms on State- 
owned lands. 
Creation of retail markets 
 
 
Entertainment Industry  Financial assistance to new 
projects. 
 
Film industry  State agency promotes the T&T 
industry abroad. 
Fiscal incentives: expenditures 
rebates. 
 
Fish and Fish Processing  Training in food safety   
Merchant marine    Preparation of the sectoral report. 
Printing and Packaging    Preparation of the sectoral report. 
Yachting industry  Coordination of training courses.  Preparation of the sectoral report. 
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the labor productivity growth rates of several related industrial sectors allows us to infer that 
they did not outperform average growth in recent years. In fact, if we consider worker 
productivity growth for 33 industrial sectors as supplied by the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO), 13 were identified as belonging to the targeted sectors, and only four of them 
outperformed the average productivity rate of growth between 1998-1999 and 2005-2006. 
These were Fruit and Vegetable Processing, Alcoholic Beverages, Meat, Poultry and Fish and 
Printing and Packaging.
13 The data thus show that the chosen sectors might not be the fastest- 
growing ones—a characteristic that should be expected if they belong to the group with 
comparative advantages in the country. 
   However, even though the favored sectors can be questioned on the ground that they 
were not chosen on the basis of sound criteria, the institutions created for Vision 2020 may be 
helpful for collaboration with the private sector in obtaining the main instruments for 
developing clusters.  
In fact, the Government set up institutions basically to enhance productivity and elicited 
information from the private sector related to existing activities that they have considered 
strategic. This approach can be seen as composed of two parts: 
 
•  First, a top-level decision in the Ministerial Committee to target 
sectors/clusters. This is a sort of strategy-driven approach. Its main problem 
arises from the lack of sound criteria for choosing the sectors/clusters. In this 
regard, a policy based on venture capital to finance new activities which 
would reduce the externalities related to a self-discovery process would be 
preferable to this type of strongly centralized decision. 
•  Second, a lower-level organization (the multi-sectoral group) and its technical 
sub-committees to elaborate operational plans. In these commissions the 
participation of the private sector was very important. The main drawback of 
this institutional setting is the lack of accountability concerning the 
application of the policies. Obviously, if the selected clusters are wrongly 
chosen, the organization at lower levels will be useless. 
 
                                                           
13 See Appendix A. 
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Colombian and the Brazilian approaches. Even though the process originated in the 
governmental sphere, private stakeholders assumed an important role as part of the committees 
and multi-sectoral groups in the different discussions around Vision 2020. 
The PDPs for clustering those chosen sectors are still ongoing. As discussed above, PDPs 
for some of the sectors or activities have not been fully implemented. In particular, the anecdotal 
evidence seems to suggest that, except in Food and Beverage and in ICT, there were no 
significant advances in evaluating their impacts. 
Since this is the case, it should be noted that another recurrent problem arises: the lack of 
reliable statistical information to evaluate the performance of the PDPs.  This scarcity of 
statistics is a common characteristic of the entire region. However, the Government is committed 
to monitoring the achievement of goals through a program called “Managing for Development 
Results” (MfDR). This is a strategy that focuses on using information of the results of 
development interventions in order to improve decision-making, a sort of feedback process based 
on the results achieved. 
In January 2007, the Government set up the Program Management Office (PMO) in the 
Ministry of Planning and Development. This Office has been mandated to lead, guide and co-
ordinate the implementation of all Vision 2020 activities in the Public Sector. The PMO is 
required, inter alia, to evaluate and measure performance and development outcomes of projects 
and programs; to build monitoring and evaluation capacity in the public sector; disseminate 
knowledge and best practices across the public sector; establish standards which will be used as 
benchmarks across the public sector; and report on the status of plan implementation and 
progress at the operational level. 
Between February and May 2007, the PMO conducted a Vision 2020 Readiness 
Assessment Survey that involved 23 ministries. More than 140 interviews with Senior Public 
Officers were conducted to determine their perceptions of Vision 2020 and the capacity for 
monitoring and evaluation of projects within the public sector, among other issues. The findings, 
presented in Operational Plan 2007-2010, Transformation in Progress 2007 Report, included the 
following: 
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14 are rarely prepared and in instances where they have 
been developed, this is due to the requirements of multilateral institutions; 
•  Logical frameworks constitute a “paper exercise” rather than a mechanism 
that facilitates the tracking of a project’s implementation or contribution to 
identified goals/outcomes; 
•  Despite the identification of indicators and sources of data collection in 
logical frameworks, the actual collection, collation, analysis and utilization of 
such data are rarely undertaken; 
•  There is a lack of effectiveness of existing monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms within the public sector; 
•  Some monitoring agencies encounter difficulty in ensuring that their 
recommendations are implemented; 
•  Monitoring and evaluation across the public sector is not effectively 
coordinated; 
•  Performance evaluation or results are not widely used in decision-making or 
for the management of programs; 
•  There are deficiencies in terms of availability of reliable, valid and timely 
economic and social data to track progress towards the achievements of the 
goals of Vision 2020. 
 
However, the 2007 and 2008 progress reports
15 represent an important advance. 
Unfortunately, these reports show more qualitative than quantitative indicators, and they are 
not broad enough to attain the precision that is required to evaluate particular PDPs.  
Finally, it must be noted that the soundness of PDPs is closely related to the stability of 
goals. In Trinidad and Tobago, however, the government has frequently changed the selection 
of sectors to be fostered. Ministries, agencies and private stakeholders try to accommodate the 
new objectives but lose efficacy in this way.  
                                                           
14 Logical framework is the name given to a management tool used in project design, execution and evaluation. 
15 Also, the Government signed an agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in May 2007, to 
access grant funding for the introduction of a system of Managing for Results in the Public Service. This Project has 
three main components: a) Preparation of a Medium Term Action Plan for the Strengthening of Results Based 
Management in the Public Sector; b) Building consensus about the challenges and benefits of Results-Based 
Management and, c) Institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Planning and Development. 
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policy process are: 
 
1. The strengthening of the venture capital program (VCIP), which would help the 
economy to reveal potential activities with comparative advantages.  
2. The continuation of the Public-Private collaboration using the institutions 
created with Vision 2020. 
3. The improvement of accountability in agencies as well as in PDPs. 
4. Enlarging the scope of activities included in programs such as the Venture 
Capital Initiative Program (VCIP) in order to incorporate those belonging to 
the energy cluster, which has been shown to be very efficient. 
 
5.2 The Case of PDP for Tourism 
 
5.2.1 Institutional Setting: Origin and Main Actors  
 
The Vision 2020 Tourism Strategic Development Plan (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 
2004) identifies tourism as a growth driver and a source of diversification away from energy. 
Tourism is one of the largest and fastest-growing sectors in the world and a major driver of 
growth for Caribbean countries. However, Trinidad and Tobago seems to be one of the region’s 
least developed countries in this area, ranking 8
th in tourist preferences in the English-speaking 
Caribbean nations. In 2006, Trinidad & Tobago had 530 thousand international arrivals, but only 
67.5 percent were tourists, representing tourism revenues of US$ 260 million. In that same year 
the Dominican Republic welcomed 4.3 million international tourists and tourism revenues were 
US$ 3.4 billion. In terms of international tourists per square kilometer, Trinidad and Tobago has 
the lowest ratio in the English-speaking Caribbean, with 87.6 tourists per square km.  
Trinidad and Tobago welcomes about half a million of tourists each year, representing 
2.3 percent of the 19 million tourists visiting the Caribbean islands in 2007.  However, although 
the country can offer the same natural landscape as its neighbors—especially in Tobago—a  
simple comparison to other countries shows that Trinidad and Tobago’s tourism industry did not 
perform as well as others.   
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Visitor Arrivals 
Tourist Arrivals      457,387  Cruise Passengers        85,859 
    Summer  64.80%     Summer  26.70% 
    Winter  35.20%     Winter  73.30% 
Visitor Profile 
Tourist Arrivals by Purpose of Visit  Tourist Arrivals by Place of Stay 
   Holidays  67.50% Hotels  25.30% 
   Business  19.30% Apartment/Guest Houses  6.10% 
   Other  13.20% Private  59.30% 
 Other  9,20% 
Total income from tourism as % GDP  2.3%  
Accommodation and other statistics 
Rooms 5,929  
Room Occupancy Rates  52.0%  
Land Area (square kilometers)  5,128  
Population (thousands mid-year 2004)  1,294.5  
Source: Caribbean Tourism Organization.   
 
Table 7 below shows the country’s relative position compared to other neighboring 
destinations. In fact, with respect to the number of visitors Trinidad & Tobago ranks 11
th out of 
30 destinations. However, the number of tourists per square kilometer of land is 88, well below 
of the regional average of 1,362, making the country 23
rd according to that criterion.  Other 
indicators, such as the number of tourists per inhabitant, the number of rooms per area and the 
income from tourism as percentage of the GDP places the country in one of the lowest position.   
 
Table 7. Tourism Indicator Rankings for Trinidad and Tobago 






Arrivals (2007)  11
th   30 
Number of tourists per sq km of land  23
rd   28 
Number of tourists per inhabitant  26
th 28 
Rooms per sq km of land  23
rd   28 
Tourism expenditure as % of GDP  20
th   20 
Source: See Appendix C. 
 
The tourism industry involves many sectors of the economy and requires a fair amount of 
coordination to develop, particularly international tourism, since externalities are large and the 
economies of scales in some related sectors are also high (particularly in transportation). As 
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of modern production technologies in a sector that has latent comparative advantage or the 
possibility of capturing rents in international markets or generating inter-industry externalities.  
If we look at the recent history of tourism in Trinidad and Tobago, there was a period of 
substantial tourist growth in the 1960s when the country was following the same trend as other 
Caribbean countries and using fiscal incentives offered under the Hotel Development Act of 
1963.  With the oil boom of the 1970s, however, attention was diverted away from tourism as a 
source of foreign exchange revenues, and the sector had problems in surviving with a strongly 
appreciated local currency. There were no thus major hotel construction projects until the mid- 
1980s when the government once again started looking at tourism to diversify away from 
dependence on energy-based industry. At that time the lack of physical infrastructure for the 
tourist industry was the main obstacle to further development in this sector.     
Continuing with the diversification efforts perhaps as a result of the experience of 
neighboring countries, the government took some initiatives to develop this sector in the mid-
1990s. The National Planning Policy in the government’s 1993-1995 Medium Term Policy 
Framework (MTPF) document stated “of all the sectors, tourism has the potential to generate 
significantly increased employment opportunities within a short period of time.”  Later, the 
1994-1996 MTPF discussed preparing a Tourism Master Plan and the development of the 
tourism infrastructure with IDB assistance. The Ministry of Tourism was established in 1994, 
developing and implementing tourism-related projects, building awareness of the tourism 
industry and facilitating tourism investment and development of the industry.  By 1995 a 
Tourism Master Plan was completed, which addressed national tourism vision and policy, market 
potential, marketing strategies, preparation for tourism, environmental considerations, product 
development and economic feasibility.  From this plan emerged another IDB project, the Short 
Term Program of Support for the Development of the Tourism Industry. 
This trend continued as the 1997-1999 MTPF devoted a large amount of space to tourism 
and attempted to implement the IDB Short Term Program.  The program was to be implemented 
by TIDCO, which prepared a Strategic Plan for the period 1998-2000.  The 2001-2003 MTPF 
additionally contained a Government pledge to continue to establish policies and implement 
programs to facilitate the development of tourism.  There was talk of a new Tourism 
Development Act and government assurances of establishing systems and procedures to ensure 
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in the small National Budget allocation of 0.3 percent of the recurrent budget to the Ministry of 
Tourism. McLeod and Airey (2007) note that, although Trinidad and Tobago completed a 
Tourism Master Plan in 1995, more than 10 years later this “Master Plan is still to be 
implemented and a written policy to be devised.”  
From the institutional standpoint, the Ministry of Tourism coordinated a Policy Working 
Committee comprising the Ministry of Tourism, the Tourism Development Company (TDC), 
policy advisers and other technical staff to develop the first Draft National Tourism Policy 
document with the participation of the Division of Tourism of the THA. The completion of this 
document was undertaken considering the comments from different stakeholders and partners 
after National Workshops held in Trinidad and Tobago. 
As is the case for other neighboring Caribbean countries, the Tourism Development Act 
2000, provides for several forms of tax relief for investment in tourism. The Act, further 
discussed in Box 1, provides for benefits to be granted to the owners/operators of various types 
of tourism projects once these projects have the potential for contributing substantially to the 
development of the tourism sector. Those benefits, administered by the TDC agency, include tax 
holidays of up to seven years, tax exemption on profits from the initial sale of villas, 
condominiums and other sites, carry-over of losses from tax exemption period, duty concessions 
on vehicles, duty exemption for building materials and articles of tourism equipment, capital 
allowances and accelerated depreciation.  
Tobago is the smaller of the two islands in the union. Local governance of Tobago lies 
with the Tobago House of Assembly (THA).  Tobago has the greater potential to becoming a 
successful tourism destination, being a winner of several eco-tourism awards, and having rich 
green vegetation, coral reefs, beaches and a picturesque landscape.  
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This Act concedes fiscal benefits to operators of different activities related to tourism. In fact, the 
tax benefits are conferred by the Minister of Tourism on a new project or on the expansion of an 
existing project. These benefits are the following: 
a) Taxes on Profit exemption not exceeding seven years. 
b) Taxes on Profit exemption derived from the initial sale of a villa or condominiums or the site 
for a villa or condominiums that forms part of a resort which is an approved tourism project. 
c) A carry-over from a tax exemption period. 
d) A tax exemption on interest paid for loans used for an approved tourism project. 
e) Customs duty at the rate of ten per cent for imported inputs. 
 
Incentives for the following tourism projects are reserved solely for nationals of Trinidad and 
Tobago: 
a) Accommodation facilities under twenty-one rooms. 
b) Transportation services (ferry services, charter boats, VIP limousines, motor cars, tour buses, 
taxis, etc.); 
c) Ground tour operations or destination management companies. 
 
 
5.2.2 The Case for Policy Intervention  
 
Why should the Government intervene in this particular industry? Perhaps the main cause is 
related to the needs of coordination. There is a coordination failure in setting up basic 
infrastructure in new areas. There is also the need for some regulation regarding standards in 
areas such as the quality of rooms, the training of human resources (which may involve some 
coordination because of externalities), the protection of the environment and natural resources 
which demands public intervention and, finally, the supply of neighboring destinations, which 
implies granting compensatory benefits whenever there is tax competition among them.  
Let us review briefly each of these items. Firstly, the build-up of basic infrastructure 
needs to be coordinated by the State due to the typical market failure implicit in supplying public 
goods.  That is, the non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption of these goods make 
private provision difficult without centralized coordination. This is particularly true in basic 
infrastructure such as ports, airports and roads. Whenever such market failure is present, 
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such as coordinating different stakeholders in order to supply the good.  
There are also other market failures related to tourism. Following the classification set 
forth by Nelson (1970, 1974), there are basically three types of goods: experience, search and 
credence goods. Tourism activity can be associated with the first type. In fact, the quality of 
experience goods cannot be verified before purchasing them, which makes these goods different 
from search goods, for which information on quality can be acquired through investing in 
information. As a consequence, some producers of experience goods will attempt to provide 
consumers with signals about the quality of their products. However, there could be some 
opportunistic behavior if the bad quality suppliers cannot be disassociated from the rest. Due to 
this asymmetric information, in this case there is some room for governmental intervention in 
coordinating and benchmarking some classification of hotel rooms. It should also be mentioned 
that sometimes regulations are required in order to protect the environment and natural resources, 
given that the common pool problem is evidently present in this case. Finally, the government 
must sometimes grant fiscal benefits to discourage investors, domestic and foreign, from leaving 
the country and going to other competing neighbors. This tax competition is typical in the 
Caribbean region. 
 
5.2.3 Policy Outcomes and Recommendations for Improving PDPs  
 
Melo (2001) found that most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean employed 
selective financial and fiscal incentives, and natural-resource-based sectors were one of the most 
frequently favored by these policies. The fact that the main instruments used are tax incentives 
rather than loans to specific sectors reflects the idea that they were designed to attract FDI. Tax 
incentives take two forms in the Caribbean region. The most usual form is the tax holiday 
designed to attract foreign investment, and in many countries of the region tax breaks are the 
usual instruments. 
In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, fiscal incentives in tourism are basically tax holidays 
aimed at attracting investors, foreigners as well as nationals. Other policies seem to impede this 
incentive, such as limitations placed on foreign investors in some activities or the bureaucratic 
process of approval for investment in Tobago. 
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governing bodies seeking sometimes different goals: the central government and the local 
government, the THA. Accordingly, tourism policy might prove ineffective. The main arm of the 
THA, which implements tourism policy, is the Department of Tourism. Only after the Tobago 
House of Assembly Act passed in 1996 did tourism legally become an area of THA 
responsibility. On the other hand, the central government maintained its tourism policy through 
TDC (Tourism Development Company Limited), sometimes conflicting with the local 
authorities according to McLeod and Airey (2007).  
In addition, the Government has historically paid little attention to tourism either as a 
development driver or as a source of revenue, which has not aided private sector development. 
The country faces the challenge of developing the sector in the face of strong competition from 
other Caribbean countries, which have a more developed sector, more generous fiscal incentives, 
and an established international reputation. On the other hand, since the country is starting later, 
it can benefit from its neighbors’ experiences.  
The Sub-committee Report on Tourism, as part of the Vision 2020 documents, points to 
three main problems: 
 
a)  The current legislation is not all-inclusive and a number of weaknesses have 
made it difficult to administer the Tourism Development Act 2000; 
b)  The main agency, then TIDCO and now TDC, suffered from political 
interference and it is financially constrained; 
c)  There is no clear guideline as to which agency is responsible for the product 
since many agencies share the responsibility (THA, TDC and the Ministry of 
Tourism). 
 
Last but not least, the Ministry of Tourism in its Draft of National Tourism Policy of 
Trinidad and Tobago (July 2008) stresses that the restriction on foreign investors and workers, 
the lack of up-to-date data on the sector and a limited collaboration between public and private 
sector stakeholders represent weaknesses for the development of this sector. However, it can be 
asserted that the roots of tourism underdevelopment in Trinidad and Tobago are the result of a 
combination of several factors, some of which can be fixed by specific vertical PDPs while 
others would require horizontal PDPs.  
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Trinidad and Tobago brand name as an international destination. On the one hand, fiscal 
incentives may be eroded by competition among Caribbean countries to attract investment. 
Moreover, some fiscal benefits are exclusive to local investor,s and if a foreign company wants 
to invest in some tourism activity in the island of Tobago, the company will face another 
important barrier: the approval of both the THA and the Ministry of Tourism.  On the other hand, 
there is an important place for public intervention in tourism marketing and benchmarking of 
services. As a matter of fact, these policies are the responsibility of three separate agencies: the 
THA, the Ministry of Tourism and the TDC; uncoordinated efforts and sometimes conflicting 
objectives make it difficult to implement effective policies. This issue is particularly important in 
the fiercely competitive environment of Caribbean tourism, which requires investment in a well-
known international brand to attract tourists. Also, the authorities might coordinate some basic 
standards regarding quality of services such as a starred classification system.
16  
There are other market failures which would require PDPs of the horizontal type. One is 
related to labor shortages, especially of low-skill workers. This is a manifestation of the very 
well known Dutch disease that produces an overheated economy during periods of high 
international oil prices. According to the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT)
17, some 
initiatives have been undertaken recently to alleviate the labor shortage. One such initiative was 
the revision of the immigration regulations relating to the employment of foreign nationals. The 
Cabinet approved amendments to the Immigration Act to simplify the processing and issuance of 
visas and work permits to non-nationals. Some of the amendments included the submission of 
work-permit applications electronically; the submission of group work-permit applications for 
groups of 10 or more persons; the issuance of multiple entry visas when required; and the 
issuance of visas by immigration officers to holders of work permits when they arrive at a port of 
entry in Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, under the CARICOM Single Market agreement, the 
categories of workers eligible for free movement were expanded in 2007 to include nurses and 
teachers. Finally, there was a proposal for a further expansion to include domestics and 
hospitality workers. 
                                                           
16 However, this classification can be organized among members of the Industry. 
17 Annual Economic Survey 2007 (CBTT). 
  52Finally, other PDP required to avoid the stifling of growth of this industry is the reduction 
of the bureaucracy. One of the most recurrent problems pointed out by some of the interviewees 
is the excessive delays and red tape costs imposed by the lack of dynamism in the State structure. 
This is facilitated by the absence of accountability in public sector agencies. 
To sum up, there are several market failures that deserve public intervention to enhance 
tourism productivity: infrastructure, information for consumers, protection of the environment 
and tax competition. When there are three institutions in charge of usually overlapping 
responsibilities and with no necessarily aligned objectives, every policy suffers from effective 
implementation. Trinidad and Tobago not only has this institutional problem but also its policies 
are centered on fiscal benefits and to a lesser extent on other PDPs to solve what the market 
failures call for.  
 
6. Horizontal PDPs 
 
6.1 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Policy (MSME PDP) 
 
6. 1.1 Institutional Setting: Origin, Main Actors  
 
Trinidad and Tobago has been attempting to diversify its economy since the 1980s. In view of 
the increasing importance of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) to growth and 
development, the Government in 1998 appointed a Task Force to examine the operation of 
MSMEs in Trinidad and Tobago and to make recommendations for their improvement.  As 
reported in the Enterprises Development Policy and Strategic Plan 2001-2005, the critical areas 
distinguished by the 1998 Task Force were as follows:  
  
•  Co-ordination among MSME developmental agencies 
•  Harmonization of MSME policies and programs 
•  Access to credit and other sources of finance 
•  Training and human resource development 
•  Marketing opportunities and development 
•  Institutional and infrastructural arrangements 
•  Other business development support services 
 
In the latest development plan articulated for Trinidad and Tobago, the Government has 
been attempting to put systems in place to ensure that the country attains developed country 
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18 To attain this goal, the government has targeted there are several key 
areas in the economy that the government has targeted for sustained economic development.  
One of the important areas in this regard is the proposed enhancement of the Micro, Small and 
Medium Enterprise (MSME) sector to increase its contribution to GDP.  Targeting this area is 
even more important in light of the six sub-sectors chosen for promotion and development in the 
Vision 2020 development plan—it is highly likely that many MSMEs will feature prominently in  
advancing these six sectors.   
The following table shows the definition of micro, small and medium businesses in 
Trinidad and Tobago as recommended by the 1998 Task Force. Businesses which are 
independently owned and managed, and with these characteristics, can qualify for certain   
government assistance programs.  Data from the list of business establishments in Trinidad and 
Tobago generated by the Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago in 2005 show that 
approximately 68 percent of the enterprises listed could be classified as micro enterprises based 
on their number of employees. 
 
Table 8. Definition of Small Businesses in Trinidad and Tobago 
Type of Enterprise  Employment  Assets (In TT$)  Sales (In TT$) 
Micro  1 - 5  $10,000 - $250,000  <$250,001 
Small  6 – 25  $250,001 - $1.5m  $250,001 - $5m 
Medium  26-50  $1.5m – $5m  $5m – $10m 
Source:  Enterprises Development Policy and Strategic Plan 2001-2005. 
 
The Government’s involvement in MSMEs centers on two state-owned institutions: the Business 
Development Company (BDC) and the National Entrepreneurial Development Company 
(NEDCO). The BDC’s mandate is to facilitate the growth and expansion of SMEs.  The BDC 
pursues its mandate by providing loan guarantees for commercial bank lending to these 
enterprises.  It also provides direct support for capital investment by way of lease financing.  For 
the acquisition of working capital through financial institutions, the BDC guarantees up to 85 
percent of loans to a maximum of TT$500,000,
19 with the possibility of increasing to TT$1.5 
                                                           
18 The Vision with respect to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises is “To create profitable and sustainable 
opportunities in the non-energy sector, while contributing towards GDP development and employment in a 
facilitative environment” (Vision 2020 Draft Report on Industry and Entrepreneurship).   
19 For comparison purpose, the exchange rate is approximately TT$6.2 per each U.S. dollar. 
  54million. The company has issued 5,190 guarantees to date, valued at TT$130 million and 
covering loans of over TT$250 million. The Caribbean Leasing Company Limited (CLCL), a 
BDC subsidiary, provides financial leasing for the acquisition of capital equipment for plant 
expansion, modernization and upgrading.  
The government has sought to provide venture capital financing by offering tax credits 
for contributions to a venture capital fund.  The supply of venture capital to prospective 
entrepreneurs has however been very limited.  The BDC also delivers technical assistance 
programs with a focus on training for management and entrepreneurial development, as well as 
on the provision of project management and company-specific consultancy services for business 
growth. 
NEDCO’s primary mandate is the management of a credit program for micro businesses.  
It also offers other business support services including entrepreneurial education and 
development, business advisory and coaching services, training and business mentorship.  In an 
effort to strengthen the country’s entrepreneurial culture, NEDCO recently expanded its training 
programs to secondary schools and tertiary institutions. The Government’s vision is to integrate 
entrepreneurship into the school curriculum at all levels, starting at the primary school level. This 
organization aims to become a “one-stop-shop” for entrepreneurial support services. 
Services provided by this agency include the following:  
a.  Loans to micro business under non-stringent conditions.  
b.  Business Advisory: The organization has Business Development Officers at 
all 14 locations to offer information on critical issues such as marketing, 
financial management, business planning and supply chain management. 
c.  Promotional support: Access to marketing and promotional channels provides 
real opportunities to SMEs to foster growth and innovation. NEDCO provides 
all customers avenues for promotion by facilitating their participation in 
marketing and distribution initiatives on a consistent basis.  
 
NEDCO lends money for up to four years and offers short-term loans as well; the interest 
rate is fixed at 8 percent a year.  Another goal of NEDCO is to provide training to entrepreneurs 
with related courses on topics such as reading balance sheets, calculating cash flows and training 
in procurement.  The types of business supported include wholesale  retail traders; 
  55manufacturing; frozen bakery products; convenience stores; beauty salons and barber shops; 
photography and video services; printing and desktop publishing; art and craft; leather goods; 
carpet and upholstery cleaning; IT services; security services; event planning and party rentals; 
dance studio and theatre production; agro processing; educational and job training services; 
restaurant and catering services; nursing and personal care services; child day care centers; 
therapeutic services; tourism (tours, tour guides); auto body shop and mechanic; housekeeping 
services; signs and advertising services; plumbing, carpentry and masonry; iron and wood 
working; welding landscaping and yard maintenance.
20 
 
6.1.2 The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
Many countries around the world apply policies directed in some way to support micro, small 
and medium enterprises (Rodríguez-Clare, 2005b). This situation applies even more in less 
developed countries where, in contrast to developed countries, the size distribution of plants is 
highly biased towards smaller ones (see, for example Tybout, 2000, for the case of 
manufacturing). 
In fact, according to Tybout, perhaps the most striking distinctive feature of the 
manufacturing sector in less developed countries is its so-called “dualism”—in many industries 
there are a large number of micro and small businesses and a handful of modern, large-scale 
plants producing similar goods side by side. Across countries, these microenterprises generally 
operate generally in the informal sector and rely heavily on informal credit systems.  Moreover, 
these firms use labor-intensive technology and account for an important share of the jobs in the 
economy. 
Rodríguez-Clare (2005b) argues that the economic value of supporting SMEs is limited.  
However, for the Government these policies seem to be associated with innovation, 
competitiveness and growth, and the promotion of SMES in order to create new firms and 
stimulate new activities appears to have been somewhat justified. In fact, the Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003) hypothesis on the externalities generated by “self-discovery” is closely related to 
the creation of new firms. However, such externalities justify only supporting innovative activity 
in specific projects directed to external markets and not a more general policy toward SMEs. 
Why should these PDPs be focused on exporting firms? Because it is highly probable that future 
                                                           
20 http://www.nedco.gov.tt/ 
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the rest of the world. 
Perhaps the most cited argument for supporting SMEs involves the credit constraints 
facing small firms. As credit market imperfections prevent low-wealth entrepreneurs from 
obtaining loans, they cannot enlarge their scale of plants to reach the optimal size and thus  
produce below the efficient level of output. However, firms that start out small due to low equity 
levels and credit constraints will generally earn a higher rate of return and experience a higher 
rate of growth. Consequently, firms that remain small and with low productivity long after their 
creation may do so as a result of intrinsically low productivity to begin with rather than credit 
constraints.  In this case, then, the most efficient policy is to focus on new or young firms rather 
than all small firms.  
Government intervention should also address the source of distortion, in this case credit 
markets. Policies to alleviate dysfunctional loan markets range from the strengthening of 
property rights to facilitating the establishment of credit bureaus. As Rodríguez-Clare (2005a) 
has noted, however, even applying the right policies would not eliminate the distortions that 
cause young companies to suffer credit constraints. In this case, the Government should provide 
grants to young firms rather than the labor training, technology transfer and export support 
services usually found in the region. 
Rodríguez-Clare points out two important reasons for helping to explain why SME 
policies are likely to fail: 
•  Small firms have low productivity on average all around the world, 
particularly in less developed countries. In poor countries, SMEs generally 
arise as a consequence of weak labor market demand in labor market rather 
than entrepreneurship. Also, as SMEs already make up a significant share of 
all businesses in countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, PDPs promoting 
them could reduce overall productivity in the economy. 
•  PDPs designed to address SMEs generally have a wide scope, attempting to  
reach a large group of firms without a proper evaluation of the real number of 
businesses in need of assistance.  
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that does not enjoy solid conceptual foundations and is likely to prove ineffective in practice” (p. 
11). 
 
6.1.3 Policy Outcomes and Recommendations for Improving the PDP  
 
Although comprehensive data permitting a reliable estimate of the impact of recent policies are 
not available, the scarce existing data suggest strong growth in the number of MSMEs served by 
NEDCO and BDC over the last few years. As of November 2007, the NEDCO program has built 
a client base of 6,500 businesses and has advanced close to TT$100 million in loans to various 
sectors including light manufacturing, services and food and agro-processing.  Since 2002, about 
5,000 persons have also benefited from the training and mentorship programs.  It should be 
noted, however, that most of the SMEs served to date confine their activities largely to the 
domestic market. From July 2007 to July 2008, the National Entrepreneurial Development 
Company Limited (NEDCO) has distributed approximately 1,471 loans at a value of TTD 
$50.14 million to Small and Micro Enterprises. This implies an average loan of TT$ 34,100 
(US$ 5,500). 
In general, Trinidad and Tobago’s PDPs toward micro, medium and small firms suffer 
from several problems: 
•  The complete absence of a quantitative evaluation program. The lack of 
accountability of programs and of governmental agencies is an important issue 
to be solved as prerequisite to making the PDPs useful and effective. Not 
surprisingly, according to non-official sources the delinquency rate of 
NEDCO’s outstanding loans may be higher than 50 percent.   
•  NEDCO programs are targeted to entrepreneurs in general. If externalities 
exist in the self-discovery activities, loans and support policies should be 
addressed to entrepreneurs with new activities and products, especially with 
those selling abroad or with high potential to be exported, and not to the 
newly self-employed.  
•  NEDCO lending programs might crowd out other private lending initiatives 
such as microfinance institutions, perhaps as a consequence of the former’s 
non-stringent and morally hazardous loan conditions.  
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are generally broadly targeted to support firms on the basis of their size and 
without regard to their innovative capacity or lack thereof, the true source of 
market failure. 
 
In brief, MSMEs PDPs in Trinidad and Tobago share the same characteristics as other 
traditional programs around the world and are based on the assumption that MSMEs’ main 
constraint resides in the lack of credit, leading to their failure as exporters. More recent 
perspectives, however, suggest that informational externalities brought about by innovation 
activities themselves might be the main cause of the lack of dynamism in companies. If the 
policy goal is to enhance the productivity of the economy, PDPs must be designed to encourage 
innovation activity rather than target companies because of their size, which is a distributional 
objective. Following this argument, PDPs should be designed to encourage innovation in order to 
meet very specific goals. NEDCO and BDC can be transformed to accomplish these objectives.   
 
6.2  Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
 
6.2.1 Institutional Setting: Origins and Main Actors 
 
In Trinidad and Tobago, a Free Trade Zones Program was designed to encourage local and 
foreign investment in export-driven projects so as to create jobs, develop skills and create 
external markets for products.  The program is administered by the Trinidad and Tobago Free 
Zones Company Limited (TTFTZ) under the Free Zones Act (1988). 
The TTFTZ, which is in charge of the establishment of new firms, reviews applications 
taking into account foreign exchange earning capacity and potential employment generation. No 
sectoral limitation is applied. Approved companies are allowed to supply domestically a 
maximum of 20 percent of goods produced, subject to the payment of import duties.  Under the 
Trinidad and Tobago Free Zones (Amendment) Act of 1995, an area may be designated a free 
zone eligible to the incentives under the Act. Free Zone enterprises are permitted to establish in 
any part of the country. They are 100 percent exempt from the following:  
 
•  Customs duties on capital goods, parts and raw materials for use in the 
construction and equipping of premises and in connection with the approved 
activity;  
  59•  Import and export licensing requirements;  
•  Land and building taxes;  
•  Work permit fees;  
•  Foreign currency and property ownership restrictions;  
•  Capital gains and income taxes;  
•  VAT on goods supplied to a Free Zone;  
•  Duties on vehicles for use only within the Free Zone. 
 
The prescribed activities which may be carried on in a free zone include: a) warehousing 
and storing; b) manufacturing operations; c) transshipment operations; d) loading and unloading 
operations; e) exporting; f) importing; g) service operations including banking; h) insurance and 
professional services; i) packaging and shipping; j) assembling; k) processing, refining, purifying 
and mixing and; l) merchandising, including international trading on products. Production 
activity involving petroleum, natural gas or petrochemicals and activities involving investment in 
excess of US$50 million do not qualify for the program. 
Additionally, the Trinidad and Tobago Free Zones Company Limited regulates 
companies in free zones and makes recommendations to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 
enterprises eligible for free zone status.  
During the years when the TTFTZC was developed, Trinidad and Tobago was in a 
distressful economic situation. The unemployment rate rose suddenly, and the Government 
sought a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The National Alliance 
for Reconstruction (NAR) government in power wanted to create jobs quickly, and an 
international consulting firm was hired to assist in this process. It was subsequently decided that 
Trinidad would adopt the Free Trade Zone framework, which had proven highly successful in 
Jamaica.
21 The company would operate like a private company, with the Government owning 
shares and State limited to appointing the Chairman. Although the trade unions strongly opposed 
its creation, the Act was passed, following the model of Jamaica’s legislation.  
The Point Lisas Area was subsequently declared a Free Trade Zone. Although everything 
was in place, the Point Lisas area remained closed and no activity ensued. There were no tenants 
or employees, only a board of directors.  
                                                           
21   According to Madani (1999, p. 66) “The success of Mauritian, Dominican Republic and Jamaican EPZs 
highlights the importance of allowing geographical diversity and EPFs [Export Processing Firms]”. 
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by changes such as revised polices, development of plans, and a shortening of approval times.  
Initially the Free Trade Zone was developed to focus on the garment industry, but it was soon 
realized that Trinidad had no competitive advantage in that area. Soon after, companies such as 
Newcor and Nestlé were approved for activity in the Free Trade Zone.  
 
6.2.2 The Case for Policy Intervention 
 
Free trade zones (FTZ) can be seen as a horizontal PDP that attempts to solve basically a 
government failure. If the country is not attractive to investment because of insufficient 
infrastructure, high tax burden, policy instability or other government failures, a FTZ can be seen 
as a mechanism to provide specific public goods in a more efficient way and to isolate firms 
from other risks of appropriability (since, generally, the FTZ is protected by law from changes in 
regulations and the tax burden is considerably lower). Clearly, this is a second-best alternative 
given that the optimal policies involve removing market distortions in domestic markets as well 
as tariffs and taxes on international trade. 
In fact, FTZs are typically fenced-in industrial estates with companies specialized in 
selling to world markets. Firms operating inside benefit from reduced red tape, more flexible 
labor laws, tax holidays and other concessions, reasonable and modern infrastructure services 
and unlimited duty-free imports of raw and intermediate inputs and capital goods. 
Advocates of FTZs emphasize that their primary goals are to increase non-traditional 
exports, to attract FDI and to help to promote jobs to alleviate unemployment.  From the 
theoretical point of view, there are three different assessments regarding the social benefits of 
FTZs (Madani, 1999). The first one, the neoclassical approach, suggests that FTZs have more 
costs than benefits and the balance results in a net loss. This argument is based on the fact that 
this policy will increase inefficiency by distorting production away from the country’s 
comparative advantages.  A second strand of the literature, however, stresses the high mobility of 
capital, which can make a difference relative to the implications of traditional Hecksher-Ohlin 
model and thus offer some support for FTZs. Finally, a third point of view comes from the 
theory of endogenous growth, which emphasizes the zone’s spillovers to the rest of the economy. 
Generally speaking, special fiscal treatment given to FDI might justify the existence of 
FTZs. In fact, this implies a conceptually valid argument following optimal taxation theory: 
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to apply a lower tax to the former, which has higher supply elasticity. Clearly, if several 
countries are engaged in this sort of tax competition, the result might be suboptimal, and some 
domestic firms can disguise themselves as foreign investors; this appears to have been the case 
with several Chinese firms that set up in Hong Kong to obtain tax breaks, a practice known as 
“round-tripping” (Rodríguez-Clare, 2005b). Also, FTZ policy can help to reduce uncertainty 
regarding a country’s commitment to private investment since it usually entails setting the “rule 
of the game” for an extended period.  
Nonetheless, export promotion policies could be based on the Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003) argument. If there is incomplete information about a country’s comparative advantages, 
public intervention may be optimal. Since the pioneer firm does not capture the full benefits 
associated with discovering a new product, there is likely to be a lower level of investment in 
innovation, as the activity would be rapidly imitated as soon as success were achieved. 
According to this line of reasoning, export subsidies or a depreciated exchange rate would be 
justifiable as a second-best policy. However, as argued by Rodrik (2004), the first-best policy for 
overcoming this sort of informational externality is to subsidize investment in new, non-
traditional industries, which should be implemented in such a way that rents accrue only to the  
only to the initial investor and not to exports of a new line of products.  
Reviewing the FTZ literature, Madani (1999) reached conclusions including the 
following: a) the first goal of FTZ, generating foreign exchange through exports, has shown 
mixed results, with some countries achieving high levels of net exports (South Korea) whereas 
some others were barely able to reach positive net exports (e.g. Jamaica);
22 b) the linkage 
between companies in FTZs and those outside, which generally involves FDI, depends on the 
host country’s level of development, with stronger effects in countries possessing a relatively 
well-established industrial base (e.g., South Korea and Taiwan) or where firms in the FTZ use 
basic production processes with local inputs (e.g., the garment industry in Indonesia); c) the 
effect on jobs creation is varied, ranging from an important share of the labor force in the 
Dominican Republic (approximately 5 percent) to minuscule percentages as in Trinidad and 
Tobago and; d) companies in FTZs generally use low-tech production processes and require few 
                                                           
22 Net exports are gross sales minus imports. Recall that most of the exports are imports with some transformation.  
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is weak.     
 
6.2.3 Policy Outcomes and Recommendations for Improving PDPs   
 
At the time of writing there are 13 trading companies: one processing plant, two ethanol projects, 
five companies in services and five other companies doing different lines of business. These 
companies are not dependent on the local market. The Free Trade Zone in Trinidad and Tobago 
is smaller than others in the region; even compared to the domestic economy, its exports 
represent only a small percentage of the total (about 1 percent) and it employs less than 0.1 
percent of the labor force. Its impact on domestic demand is likewise low. From the policy point 
of view, the FTZ evidently did not generate the expected impact on the economy. The advocated 
goals of export growth, FDI attraction and job creation have been fulfilled only partially and on a 
very small scale. Figures 5-7 illustrate these policies’ relatively modest success. 
In this sense, proper PDPs are those which ease the “self-discovery” process for 
innovation. For example, the strengthening of the venture capital fund for innovators with strong 
State support would help the diversification of the economy more than an FTZ with insufficient 
linkages to domestic production.  There is no doubt that more effort should be put into linking 
activities in the zone with domestic production. 
Regarding PDPs for attracting FDI, the same sort of comment may be made. The 
additional benefit that a foreign investor can bring depends on whether that investor generates 
spillovers to the rest of the economy through employment, technology or innovation. This, at the 
same time, is strongly associated with the type of activity and how the company connects to 
other producers. The evidence  indicates that FTZs have stronger spillover effects in countries 
where the local technology can be complementary to the FDI and weaker effects in countries 
with a wide technological gap.    
  













The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has envisioned an unusually wide-ranging process of 
transformation that involves moving from the current emphasis on energy production to a more 
diversified economy.   The desired process was largely outlined in the Vision 2020 program,  and 
the creation of ad hoc institutions with private and public participation  process of consultation 
and discussion led to several preliminary results. Noteworthy among them is the selection of  
seven sectors for development through industrial policy. Afterwards, some PDPs were proposed 
as a consequence of public-private discussions.  
One important question to be answered about the PDPs in general is whether they will be 
sufficient to reverse the country’s pattern of deep dependency on energy production. Clearly, the 
efficacy of the implemented PDPs depends largely on broader policies to mitigate the Dutch 
disease problem. In fact, most of the analyzed policies are strongly related to encouraging the 
production of tradable sectors (the chosen sectors in Vision 2020, tourism and the FTZ).  
Several important PDPs have yet to be proposed, implemented or evaluated.  In some 
sectors PDPs were implemented but are far from being completed. In other sectors, proposals 
have been made  but their viability has not even been evaluated. To be fair, there is an ongoing 
process of discussion and evaluation, but the accountability of the agencies and bodies in charge 
is still weak. 
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coordination of several consultative bodies with the private sector in designing policies to 
address market failures. In this regard, rather than stressing the policy outcomes, we must point 
out that a sound foundation was created for a policy process that can be used to continue 
improving the PDPs. Rodrik (2008) has emphasized that the analysis of industrial policy does 
not need to focus on policy results, which can be inherently uncertain, but on getting the process 
right to solve what the market cannot. 
However, one of the pervasive problems in the region, including the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago, is the absence of quantitative data to assess the scale of intervention as well as 
intervention’s outcomes and impacts (Melo and Rodríguez–Clare, 2006). This is a basic 
requirement because PDPs and the agencies in charge must be flexible enough to solve the 
market failures revealed by the private sector. This is the spirit of the modern approach of 
industrial policies which should be followed.  
Finally, it should be noted that the selection of sectors could be misleading. The fact that 
one industry may have strong externalities—an issue not evaluated here—does not necessarily 
mean that it should be developed. What have to be supported are activities which generate those 
externalities, such as the process of innovation or the discovery of new products, as favoring 
supposedly more advanced sectors might not lead to clustering, that is, to strengthening   
externalities. In fact, as the same good can be produced using different technologies, a selected 
basket of goods can be produced with a “backward” technology rather than with the expected 
high-productivity process. It is therefore  advisable for Trinidad and Tobago’s PDPs to move  
towards supporting new processes and new goods, even among the chosen group of sectors.     
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  68Appendix A: PDPs for Targeted Sectors 
 
A.1 Food and Beverages 
 
A.1.1 Creation of Large Farms 
 
In 2007, 15 sites were selected for the creation of the Large Farms (LFs). The available land, a 
total of 2,644 acres, was to be distributed for the production of vegetables, livestock, root crops, 
mixed farming and livestock. 
These sites were selected by the State according to criteria such as topography, soil 
fertility, land capability and access to utilities. The model for the operations of the LFs will be 
joint ventures and leasehold arrangements with private investors. The private sector will be 
required to undertake on-farm infrastructural development and investments, and the Rural 
Development Company of Trinidad and Tobago (RuDeCOTT) will be contracted to implement 
the LF Programme, which comprises i) advertising locally and internationally for investors to 
develop the farms and ii) development of infrastructure up to the farm gate and subdivision of 
lands where necessary. 
  Infrastructure development at LFs will include the conduct of surveys and subdivisions 
and the provision of access roads, drainage and utilities (water, electricity and telephone) up to 
the farm gate. Contracts were awarded to four consulting firms for the design of the 
infrastructure for the seven LF sites.  
Two additional LFs are being developed in Tucker Valley, Chaguaramas. These farms 
will be the subject of an arrangement between the Governments of Trinidad and Tobago and 
Cuba. A technical team from Cuba visited Trinidad and Tobago in July 2007 and has submitted 
recommendations for developing the farms. 
In 2008, two farms located at the Mon Jaloux site were allocated to the Sheep and Goat 
Society. In relation to the remaining 13 farms consultancies were awarded for the infrastructure 
and utilities construction at these sites, and requests for proposals were made for the investment, 
development, management and operation of these commercial farms. These proposals are being 
reviewed by Cabinet. 
  69A.1.2 Agricultural Access Roads 
In the first three quarters of 2007, 32 km of access roads were constructed, providing improved 
road access to 876 farmers. Another 17 km of access roads were upgraded (sealed with oil sand) 
to the benefit of 425 farmers. This is in addition to the 188.52 km of access roads that were 
constructed, upgraded and maintained, to the benefit of 4,740 farmers over the period 2002-
2006. 
During the 2007/2008 fiscal period, progress continued on the upgrade and rehabilitation 
of agricultural access roads and bridges. As of, May 2008, 28km, representing 31 access roads 
were upgraded (sealed with oil sand) and three bridges were rehabilitated. This is in addition to 
28km representing 24 roads being paved with gravel. These improvements are to the benefit of 
657 farmers. Furthermore, a Roads Rehabilitation Maintenance Programme for approximately 
29.82km of roads and eight bridges has been planned for 2009. 
 
A.1.3 NAMDEVCO Development Activities 
 
The National Agricultural Marketing and Development Corporation (NAMDEVCO) was created 
through Act No.16 in 1991 as a state agency within the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and 
Marine Resources, Trinidad and Tobago, W.I.  This agency has the goal of achieving and 
maintenance of commercially viable, sustainable agribusiness sector, by identifying new market 
opportunities both locally and abroad for agricultural and agro-industrial products. 
 
Retail Markets 
Several retail markets were established to create a more direct link between farmers and 
consumers in 2006. The elimination of middlemen resulted in better prices for both farmers and 
consumers. In 2007, two additional markets were established at St. Lucien Road and River 
Estate, Diego Martin to the benefit of 21 farmers. 
  There has recently been an even greater thrust in production and marketing efforts by 
way of promotion in the agribusiness sector. Emphasis was placed on institutionalizing retail 
markets via promoting  farmers’ markets. Given the success of these markets, plans are proposed 
for the establishment of three mobile farmers’ markets. This project’s main objective is to 
enhance the food security of every citizen by providing cheap, accessible and safe foods to 
consumers and afford farmers a fair return on their investment. 
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The following initiatives were successfully implemented in order to facilitate greater sharing of 
market information between producers and consumers: 
•  The Greenvine newsletter,  a monthly bulletin that provides information to the 
agriculture sector. 
•  The Market Price Watch, which provides weekly information on wholesale 
and retail prices for select produce in the three main daily newspapers. 
•  The National Agricultural Market Information System (NAMISTT) Website, 
which provides a range of information including agricultural prices and 
volume of produce at wholesale and retail markets, a buyers’ and sellers’ 
forum and a traders’ contact database. 
 
A.1.4 Agricultural Land Information System and Inventory of State Lands 
Over the period 2002-2007, an inventory of approximately 17,720 acres of lands was compiled. 
This database, which is updated annually, provides critical information for decision-making on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of land use. Based on the information collected, approximately 
1,042 new agricultural leases for 6,037 acres of land were allocated to persons occupying and 
actively cultivating State lands. 
 
A.1.5 Youth Apprenticeship Programme in Agriculture 
YAPA seeks to build human capital at the professional, entrepreneurial and laborers’ level 
through agricultural education and training for persons between 18 and 25 years of age. YAPA is 
comprised of two phases: YAPA I, which is an introductory eight-week phase, and YAPA II, 
which is a more intensive nine-month phase. For 2008, YAPA I-Cycle 1 had 146 graduates, 
while Cycle 2 (in progress at the time of writing) had 208 students enrolled. The second phase, 
YAPA II, inducted 64 trainees as at May 2008. In addition, YAPA training centers in Cedros and 
Penal are nearing completion. 
 
A.1.6. Grow Box Development 
The Grow Box initiative was launched in May, 2005. The program targets households with 
limited land space and provides the necessary inputs and skills to engage in subsistence farming, 
using the grow box technology. This program is expected to improve citizens’ standard of living 
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1,600 Grow Boxes have been put in place around the country. The Grow Box initiative was also 
expanded to include the nation’s schools, and to date 37 schools in three counties have benefited. 
 
A.1.7 The Food and Beverage Industry 
Initiatives undertaken to promote the food and beverage industry during the last fiscal year 
(2007/2008) focused mainly on food safety, strategic planning and new product opportunities for 
the sector. In terms of food safety, the process of establishing a National Agriculture Health and 
Food Safety Agency (NAHFSA) commenced with stakeholder discussions. In addition, an 
Assessment of the Food Safety Systems in Trinidad and Tobago was completed by the Inter-
American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) in April 2008. In planning for the 
holistic development of the sector, a draft strategic plan was produced and is currently under 
review by the Food and Beverage Industry Development Committee (FBIDC). 
 
A.2. The Entertainment Industry 
The T&T Entertainment Company’s (T&T Ent) Revolving Investment Fund provides financial 
assistance of up to 70 percent of any project. Funds are granted on the condition that T&T Ent 
receives a negotiated return on investment on the funding it provides, which is subject to a 
separate agreement. Many artists in music, dance and other cultural arenas have benefited from 
this Scheme. In the area of Marketing and Promotion, T&T Ent gained media coverage in 
Caribbean newspapers and community radio stations in Toronto-Canada. Other successful 
projects that have come on stream include the establishment of an Entertainment Directory in 
February 2008, which facilitates the online registration of artists 
 
A.3. The Film Industry  
Government continues to develop and promote the film and television industry as one of the 
country’s key creative industries as well as position Trinidad and Tobago as a prime destination 
for film production. The Trinidad and Tobago Film Company (TTFC) has marketed the country 
through several initiatives including contracting an international marketing agent, developing 
promotional material and hosting United States film scouts and producers on a familiarization 
tour in fiscal year 2008. Additionally, the Company conducted Business Partnering Meetings in 
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(AFM) and Association of Film Commissioners International (AFCI) Locations. 
Consequently, for the period July 2007 to July 2008, the TTFC facilitated 32 film crews 
from a number of countries including Japan, France, and Argentina, resulting in a total cash 
injection into the local economy of approximately TT$12 million. As an incentive to encourage 
more on location filming in Trinidad and Tobago by nationals and foreign crews, the TTFC 
honored its first application for an expenditure rebate and a second application is currently being 
assessed.  
In an attempt to increase the capacity of agencies and individuals involved in the local 
film industry, the Government continued to place emphasis on training in feature film 
production, screenwriting and business planning. 
 
A.4. Fish and Fish Processing 
Extensive work has been undertaken to transform the fish and fish processing industry into a 
modern, profitable, sustainable, and environmentally responsible sector. Government’s efforts 
concentrated on providing support and continued growth for the industry through initiatives such 
as training and certification, exploring commercial opportunities, and marketing and promotion. 
Over the last year, the Seafood Industry Development Company (SIDC) continued its 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) certification courses for fish processors 
and technicians. These capacity building training programs were aimed at promoting business 
development, improving the livelihoods of fishermen and increasing employment opportunities 
in rural coastal communities, and included: 
 
• Seafood HACCP compliance for processors 
• Eight training sessions on Sanitary Practices Onboard Fishing Vessels 
• Two workshops on proper icing practices 
 
Furthermore, training courses in organizational management, financial planning, business 
development and life skills were conducted with representatives from 25 fishing communities 
around Trinidad and Tobago. 
In terms of support to agencies involved in the sector, the SIDC collaborated with the 
Women in Fishing Association to establish a processing facility for the production of a smoked 
cured product (smoked bonito) in the Mayaro/Guayaguayare community; an icemaking facility 
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Cooperative. The latter provides a ready supply of ice to both fishermen and the wider 
community from Salybia to Matelot. 
In order to better streamline development initiatives within the sector, a needs analysis of 
the industry and a socio-economic assessment were conducted. In addition, a study on 
transshipment operations in Trinidad and Tobago was undertaken to investigate and make 
appropriate recommendations on the procedures and practices employed by foreign fishing 
vessels which transship fish and fish products through the country’s ports. 
To improve the quality of seafood available for local and export markets, educational 
material was distributed to industry stakeholders and seminars were conducted on product 
development. To further boost the economic viability of the sector, information on the use of 
traditionally underutilized species was made available Infrastructure to provide adequate 
facilities at fish landing sites to meet the required HACCP/EU standards are being undertaken at 
various sites throughout country. 
Regarding the development of commercial opportunities within the sector, aquaculture is 
being promoted to supplement dwindling marine r e s o u r c e s .  S I D C  i n  collaboration with the 
Institute of Marine Affairs is developing a commercial aquaculture pilot system which can be 
used to demonstrate to potential investors the feasibility of tank culture systems. 
 
A.5 Merchant Marine  
Further diversification of the economy would be realized by the development of the maritime 
industry. To this end, in December 2007, a comprehensive business plan was developed 
encompassing key maritime clusters, including Ship ownership, Marine Construction and Ship 
Building and Repair services. In addition, reports on the development of key sub-sectors in the 
marine industry and the human resource requirements were produced and are being finalized at 
the time of writing. 
 
A.6 Printing and Packaging 
To strengthen the Printing and Packaging industry, a needs analysis for the establishment of a 
Packaging Laboratory was conducted in 2007 and the findings of the study are under review at 
the time of writing. In November 2007, a Workforce Development Study commenced which 
would inform the Skills Foresight Report and Workforce Development Plan. The PPI Workforce 
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Development Plan was completed. Updated job classifications and training report for the 
industry were also completed, and training programs are being conducted in keeping with a PPI 
Training Plan. 
 
A.7 Yachting Industry 
A National Yachting Policy was developed by the Yachting Steering Committee (YSC). The 
Committee also commissioned a regional competitive analysis on the domestic Yachting 
Industry, which provides a framework for the further development of the industry. It is 
coordinating this country’s participation at international yachting industry events and has been 
collaborating with the National Training Agency and the University of Trinidad and Tobago on 
the development of a skills training and certification program for existing and potential 
employees. The YSC also produced and disseminated brochures on the Yachting Industry. 
The Yachting Steering Committee (YSC) is currently evaluating research findings on the 
domestic Yachting Industry. These findings will inform the conduct of the regional competitive 
analysis for further development in our yachting industry. In order to build networks and develop 
business relationships to further strengthen the industry, the country attended the 46th Annual 
Antigua Charter Yacht Show in December 2007. 
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Relative Growth in Workers’ Productivity 
Between 1998-1999 and 2006-2005 
    Relative Growth  
Ranking Targeted 
Sector 
Industry To  industrial 
average 
To industrial avg., exc. Oil, gas and 
derivatives 
1    Metal furniture  8.8                            6.9 
2  FB  Fruit and Vegetables processing  6.7                            5.2 
3    Iron, steel and related products  2.9                            2.3 
4    Batteries, mufflers and tires  2.9                            2.2 
5    Textile and garments  2.7                            2.1 
6    Metal building materials  2.6                            2.0 
7  FB  Alcoholic beverages  2.6                            2.0 
8    Furniture/mattresses  2.1                            1.6 
9    Petrochemicals  1.8                            1.4 
10  FB -F  Meat, poultry and fish  1.5                            1.2 
11  PP  Printers 1.3                            1.0 
12    Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and household 
chemicals 
1.0                            0.8 
13  PP  Newspaper publishers  0.9                            0.7 
14  FB  Edible oils and fats  0.8                            0.6 
15  FB  Bakeries  0.7                            0.5 
16    Motor vehicles  0.6                            0.5 
17    Tobacco  0.4                            0.3 
18    Industrial gases and paints  0.3                            0.3 
19  FB  Grain and feed mills  0.3                            0.3 
20    Clay bricks and blocks  0.3                            0.2 
21  FB  Non-alcoholic beverages  0.2                            0.2 
22    Household appliances  0.1                            0.1 
23    All other metal products  0.0                            0.0 
24    Concrete Products  0.0                            0.0 
25    Cement  -0.1                          -0.1 
26  FB  Dairy Products  -0.1                          -0.1 
27    Footwear  -0.5                          -0.4 
28    Sawmills  -0.5                          -0.4 
29  Y  Ship boat building materials  -0.5                          -0.4 
30  FB  All other food  -0.5                          -0.4 
31  PP  Paper Converters  -0.6                          -0.4 
32    Metal containers  -0.6                          -0.5 
33    Glass and plastic products for construction  -0.7                          -0.5 
  
 All industry Index (excl. petrochemicals, oil and 
natural gas exploration, production and refining) 
1.3                            1.0 
 All Industry Index (Including oil and sugar)  1.0                            0.8 
  
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Central Statistical Office Information.     
Note: FB is Food and Beverage Industry, PP is Printing and Packaging Industry, F is Fish and Fish Processing 
Industry and Y is Yachting Industry. 
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Appendix C.  
 
TOURISM: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION 
    
Destination Arrivals 
2007 
% # Of tourists 
per sq km of 
land 
# Of tourists 
per inhabitant
Rooms per sq 
km of land 
Tourism 
expenditure 
as % of GDP 
Anguilla            77,652  0.4% 853.3 6.21 8.3  63.7%
Antigua & Barbuda          261,786  1.4% 595.0 3.27 7.4  49.5%
Aruba          772,073 4.0% 4,289.3 7.92 38.3  n.d. 
Bahamas       1,527,622  8.0% 110.2 4.76 1.1  35.8%
Barbados          574,576  3.0% 1330.0 2.11 13.8  33.1%
Belize          251,655  1.3% 11.0 0.89 0.2  22.4%
Bermuda          305,548  1.6% 5,765.1 4.93 55.5  7.9%
Bonaire            74,309  0.4% 258.0 7.29 4.1  n.d. 
British Virgin Is.          358,056  1.9% 2,387.0 16.50 12.5 44.7%
Cancun (Mexico)       2,022,302 10.6% n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Cayman Islands          291,503  1.5% 1,121.2 6.69 20.1 30.3%
Cuba       2,152,221  11.2% 19.4 0.19 0.4  7.4%
Curacao          299,782  1.6% 675.2 2.25 7.8  n.d. 
Dominica            83,916 0.4% n.d.  n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Dominican Republic       3,979,582  20.8% 82.2 0.44 1.2  18.9%
Grenada          129,118  0.7% 375.3 1.24 4.3  44.1%
Guyana          131,487  0.7% 0.6 0.18 0.0  13.3%
Jamaica       1,700,785  8.9% 148.9 0.64 2.2  18.0%
Martinique          503,107  2.6% 474.6 1.29 7.8  n.d. 
Montserrat              7,745  0.0% 75.9 1.65 3.4  28.1%
Puerto Rico      1,361,083  7.1% 153.4 0.35 1.4  3.9%
Saba            11,673  0.1% 897.9 8.34 0.0  n.d. 
St. Lucia          287,435  1.5% 466.6 1.77 6.5  51.2%
St. Eustatius            11,568  0.1% 550.9 4.63 3.0  n.d. 
St. Kitts and Nevis            91,769  0.5% 341.1 1.92 6.5  32.7%
St. Maarten          469,407 2.5% 13,806.1 14.14 103.9 n.d. 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines            89,637  0.5% 230.4 0.89 4.6  19.4%
Suriname          162,509  0.8% 992.1 0.37 7.8  4.4%
Trinidad & Tobago          449,452  2.3% 87.6 0.35 1.2  2.3%
U S Virgin Islands          693,372  3.6% 2,027.4 6.22 14.6 n.d. 
Total area     19,132,730  100.0%  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Caribbean Tourism Organization data. 
 